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Abstract
The gravity model proved to to be one of the most successful framework for analyzing international
trade flows, being referred to as the “workhorse” in the international trade literature (Head and
Mayer (2014)). Microfoundations to this model has been provided in Anderson (1979) and it has
often been employed to estimate the effects of a variety of trade policies (see Cipollina and Salvatici
(2010) for a meta-analysis on reciprocal trade agreements, Rose (2000) for the effects of currency
unions). The two chapters of this dissertation, which are independent empirical pieces, both make
use of gravity equations for the estimation of trade flows, although with different purposes. The
first chapter focuses on the specification of the gravity equation. In the second chapter, instead,
gravity equations are employed for assessing the relationship between trade and growth: in fact,
their estimation represents the first step for the creation of an instrumental variable for export flows.
In the first chapter, a solo-authored work titled Scale Economies in European Trade, I show
that European data support the existence of economies of scale in trade flows. The impact of trade
costs on trade flows, in fact, is assumed to be constant by almost all empirical studies employing
the gravity framework. Anderson et al. (2016) are the first to depart from this assumption, allowing
trade costs to vary as a function of trade volumes. Their model nests the more traditional one
and hence can be used to test for the existence of these scale economies, which are shown to be in
place for trade between US and Canada. For my analysis I construct a comprehensive dataset for
European trade in manufacturing over a long time span (from 1980 to 2013), on which I employ
the same methodology. My results show that scale economies in trade costs are indeed a strong
empirical fact outside of the American continent, and this holds for all the 26 manufacturing sectors
considered, with an estimated average of 0.64% decrease in trade costs given by a 10% increase in
trade volume. The focus on Europe allows me to test whether the EU expansion affected these
economies of scale. While this is not true on average, it seems to be the case for some industries:
trade with a EU partner entails scale elasticities 50% lower than trade with a non-EU member for 11
sectors out of the 26 considered. I also investigate whether scale elasticities can be rationalized by
the existence of informational asymmetries. Using detailed product-level data, I do not find evidence
that the degree of product homogeneity can account for the observed cross-sectoral variation. The
scale coefficients are instead linked to country-specific institutional variables, such as the level of
corruption: exporting to the country whose level of corruption is the lowest in the sample entails half
the scale elasticity than exporting to the most corrupted one. In other words, corruption depresses
trade to an higher extent on longer distances.
In the second chapter, joint with Carlo Altomonte and Italo Colantone and titled Trade and
Growth in the Age of Global Value Chains, we revisit the relationship between trade and
income, taking into account the recent surge of global value chains (GVCs). First, we develop a new
geography-based, time-varying instrument for export, exploiting the sharp increase (almost tripling)
in the maximum size of container ships between 1995 and 2007. This global shock has an asymmetric
impact on bilateral trade flows across countries, affecting disproportionately more countries endowed
with a larger number of deep-water ports, which are needed to accommodate the new, much larger
ships. We exploit this heterogeneity for identification, building up the instrument for export in a
gravity framework. Our result show that export has a positive effect on GDP per capita, with a 0.6
elasticity. Evidence at the country-level shows that this effect works through capital accumulation.
Exploiting the decomposition methodology by Wang et al. (2013), we show that differences in the
value added composition of exports matter for trade-growth nexus. We find evidence in favor of
an income premium for countries that upgrade their positioning in GVCs, whereas the degree of
participation to GVCs does not seem to play a role. Consistent with this finding, we show that
countries whose average level of upstreamness (a’ la Antras and Chor (2013)) increases the most
over time exhibit a higher trade elasticity of income.
Both papers indirectly deal with the effect of geographical distance on international trade flows.
One of the strongest regularities in economics is certainly the negative role played on trade flows
by the distance between origin and destination. Disdier and Head (2004), comparing 1,467 different
studies, compute an average distance elasticity of trade of about -0.9. Hummels (2007) shows that
the distance elasticity of trade does not seem to diminish over time, as it would do should distance
be capturing only transportation costs, thanks to the technological developments witnessed in the
transportation sector. Distance seems then to refer to trade costs in general, including institutional,
policy and regulatory barriers that, also for historical reasons, often increase the further away coun-
tries are located.
In the first paper, I show that the impact of distance on trade flows is not constant but varies with
trade volumes. This corresponds with having a component of the composite friction described before,
hidden in the distance term, being fixed and is consistent with micro-evidence on the export behavior
obtained from firm-level data (Roberts and Tybout (1997)). It seems natural, then, to test whether
some characteristics, either at the product-level or at the country-level, have a prominent role in
explaining the non-linear effect that distance has on trade. My results find in level of corruption of
the destination country an important determinant. In the second paper, we test whether the distance
elasticity of trade varies as a function of the number of deep water ports on both the importer’s
and the exporter’s shores, capturing the extent to which countries can trade via container vessels.
The data support this claim for all the manufacturing sectors considered, showing that geographical
distance, even though non-exclusively, captures the incidence of transportation costs on export flows.
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Chapter 1
Scale Economies in European Trade
1.1 Introduction
Gravity models have been widely used in studying international trade flows in the last decades
(see Head and Mayer (2014) for a detailed review). Generally speaking, these models assume that
trade flows between two regions depend positively on the size of both the origin and the destina-
tion but are negatively correlated with the geographical distance between them. Microfoundations
for such a specification, which may resemble the Newtonian gravity formulation in physics at first
sight, was provided in Anderson (1979). In particular, trade frictions are assumed as region-pair
specific “iceberg” trade cost, meaning that a constant proportion of every shipment will melt during
transport. In empirical testing, trade cost are usually proxied by geographical measures such as the
distance and the contiguity between the trade partners.
Trade costs are usually introduced as a constant impediment to trade flows, in particular they
are assumed to play the same role independently from the volume of goods and services traded (i.e.
1
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they are linear in trade flows). Anderson et al. (2016) (from now on, AVY (2016)) are the first to
relax this assumption: they show that, for the US-Canadian case, the elasticity of trade costs with
respect to trade volumes is negative in 36 out of 56 sectors in their sample, whereas the remaining
cases exhibit constant returns to scale. This means that, for the majority of the sectors considered,
the trade costs is lower the higher the trade volume.
This paper represents the first investigation of the sensitiveness of trade costs with respect to
trade volumes in the European setting. My focus on Europe derives from different reasons. First of
all, I will prove that the scale economies in trade costs estimated by AVY (2016) are an empirical
regularity in other parts of the world. In fact, this paper shows that economies of scale in European
international trade are strong and significant for all the sectors considered over the 1980-2013 period
and that their average magnitude is very similar to the one found by AVY (2016): a 10% increase
in trade volumes corresponds to a 0.64% decrease in trade costs. Second, since scale elasticities are
a consequence of fixed trade costs, I will test whether they have been altered by the EU expansion,
which should have in principle lowered trade costs (at least in their regulatory component). Focusing
on European data allows me to test for this hypothesis while keeping the specification as simple as
possible: in fact, I will be assuming uniformity in the scale elasticity parameter in this part of the
analysis1.
My results show that belonging to the EU does not affect scale elasticities in aggregate terms.
When considering separately the manufacturing sectors, however, I find that the EU expansion
makes a difference in terms of scale economies, even though for eleven sectors only. For all these
sectors, the differences are quite high and have the same sign: economies of scale in trade costs are
1Considering non-European countries would imply a departure from this uniformity assumption. In fact, trade with
non-European countries entails higher scale elasticities on average, due to lower trade volumes, as I will show in
Section 4.
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about 50% higher when at least one trade partner is not member of the EU yet, as higher fixed
trade costs when crossing the EU border would imply. What these industry have in common is a
high weight to value ratio: for a given monetary value, they produce heavy goods. This finding
contributes to the literature on the effects of the EU expansion on international trade: showing that
there is strong cross-sectoral variation, I merge the gap between the results by Beltramo (2010),
who documents a drop in trade costs, and the ones by Nitsch (2000) and Chen (2004), showing that
trade between EU countries is subject to frictions that have not been removed yet.
Trade costs do not only represent transport costs but can be capturing “policy barriers (tariffs
and non-tariff barriers), information costs, contract enforcement costs, costs associated with the use
of different currencies, legal and regulatory costs, and local distribution costs (wholesale and retail)”
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). All these frictions could vary at the product level, at the coun-
try level or both and this could generate cross-sectoral or cross-country variation in scale elasticities.
Therefore, it may be worthwhile to analyze whether scale elasticities depend on informational or
institutional barriers.
Should informational frictions play a role, one would expect the average gain from an increase in
trade volume to be lower for more standardized goods (Rauch, 1999), hence we would observe lower
scale elasticities for those commodities. In order to test for this hypothesis, I consider disaggregated
data at the product level (SITC classification) and I show that the degree of product differentiation
does not explain the magnitude of the estimated coefficients. On the other hand, my results show
that European scale elasticities are linked to country-specific institutional variables such as the level
of corruption. In fact, I prove that a 10% increase in trade volumes implies a 0.38% decrease in
trade costs when trading with a partner with poor institutional level (high level of corruption) but
3
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implies a 0.16% decrease in trade costs when the partner’s level of corruption is low. Moreover, this
strong effect of corruption on scale elasticities is not altered by the EU membership of the countries
considered.
The paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 will outline the model, taken from AVY (2016), and
the estimating equation. Section 3 will present the data. Section 4 will prove the existence of scale
economies in Europe and show that crossing the EU border implies higher scale coefficients, though
for some sectors only. Section 5 will show that the cross-sectoral variation cannot be linked to the
degree of product differentiation, as informational asymmetries would imply. Moreover, it will prove
that scale elasticities depend on institutional variables at the country level. Section 6 will conclude.
1.2 The Model
The model follows closely the one of Anderson et al. (2016), being its adaptation to the European
setting. Instead of considering bilateral trade flows between different Canadian provinces and US
states as AVY (2016) do, in fact, I will consider those between different European countries, which
join the EU at different points in time.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003a) show that the trade flow between i and j in sector k (Xki,j)
can be expressed as
Xki,j = Y
kski b
k
j
( tki,j
Πki P
k
j
)1−σk
where Y k is the total of world shipments, ski is the share of world shipment coming from origin i
(ski =
Y ki
Y k
) and bkj is the share of world shipment arriving to destination j from all possible origins
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(bkj =
Ekj
Y k
). tki,j represents the bilateral “iceberg” trade cost: for each unit shipped, only
1
tki,j
reaches
the destination. Πki and P
k
j represent respectively the outward and the inward multilateral resistance
terms, taking into account that bilateral trade depends on trade frictions that importer and exporter
face when trading with all their trade partners, and can be written as
(Πki,t)
1−σk =
∑
j
( tki,j
P kj,t
)1−σk
bkj,t (1.2.1)
(P kj,t)
1−σk =
∑
j
( tki,j
Piki,t
)1−σk
ski,t (1.2.2)
Therefore, gravity can be estimated taking the following formula to the data:
Xki,j,t = Y
k
t
ski,t
(Πki,t)
1−σk
bkj,t
(P kj,t)
1−σk (t
k
i,j)
1−σk (1.2.3)
= ctx
k
i,tm
k
j,t(t
k
i,j)
1−σk (1.2.4)
up to an i.i.d. error, where ct = Y
k
t is a constant and x
k
it
=
ski,t
(Πki,t)
1−σk and m
k
j,t =
bkj,t
(Pkj,t)
1−σk are
respectively an exporter-time and an importer-time fixed effects.
It is important to notice that trade costs tki,j , whose empirical counterpart is usually represented
by geographical measures such as distance and contiguity, represent a constant barrier to trade flows:
in order for one unit of good to reach destination j, tki,j units need to be shipped independently from
any pair-specific variable, including the trade volume between the two trade partners. One could
imagine, instead, that trade costs are increasing in trade volumes due to congestion (Anderson and
Bandiera, 2006) or that there are economies of scale in trade costs because of the existence of a
fixed-cost component. Chaney (2014) suggests that the export behavior of firms is the result of the
creation of a network, whose links are created by pair specific buyer-seller investments. Aggregating
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the links across countries would imply bilateral scale economies in trade costs. I will show in the
next section that allowing for the existence of elasticity of trade cost with respect to trade volume v
would be entering the previous expression and alter the interpretation of the estimated coefficients,
providing a test for the existence of such scale economies.
1.2.1 Scale economies in Trade Costs
AVY (2016) allow and test for economies (diseconomies) of scale by assuming that
ti,j,t = τi,j
( ri,t
rj,t
)ρ
V
φi,j
i,j,t (1.2.5)
where τi,j is the traditional iceberg cost and ri,t and rj,t represent the appreciation of currencies i
and j with respect to a base period. The exponent ρ is the pass-through elasticity, which I assume
to be constant for all destinations for simplicity, differently from what AVY (2016) do. From now
on, I will be dropping the superscript k to ease the notation. All regressions will be nonetheless run
at the sector level, unless otherwise specified.
Vi,j,t is trade volume in physical terms, which can be written as
Vi,jt =
Xi,j,t
ti,j,t
ri,t
rj,t
(1.2.6)
where ti,j discounts for the iceberg costs encountered in the shipment and
ri,t
rj,t
takes into account
the fact that Xi,j,t is expressed in monetary terms and the nominal exchange rate may not be unitary.
φi,j is the crucial parameter, as it represents the elasticity of trade costs with respect to the
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trade volume:
φi,j =
∂ti,j,t
∂V i, j, t
V i, j, t
ti,j,t
φi,j is assumed to be equal to Bi,jφ, where Bi,j = 1 if i and j are two countries separated by a
border and zero otherwise. In other words, φi,j is zero in case of internal trade. φ represents the
scale elasticity: if it is positive, trade costs are increasing in trade volumes. If φi,j is negative,
instead, trade becomes cheaper the higher the trade volume (increasing returns to scale), whereas
we get constant returns to scale and we are back to the traditional formulation in case φi,j equals
zero. In the latter case, we are back to the original gravity model: it is nested in this specification,
so that it will be for the data to tell whether scale economies in international trade do exist.
AVY (2016) analyze US states and Canadian provinces so that there are three possible types of
trade flows: between two US states, between two Canadian provinces or between a US state and a
Canadian province. This setup allows the authors to consider nation-specific (i.e. US and Canadian)
scale elasticities. In this paper, given that the units of interest are 28 European countries, I decided
not to consider destination-specific scale elasticity. I will start with assuming uniformity in the scale
elasticity, i.e. I will impose that the elasticity parameter is the same across all destinations (for
each sector k). In section 4.1 I will check the validity of this hypothesis by testing whether scale
elasticities are differentiated for large and small countries. Such a partition of the sample will be
defined alternatively in terms of population or GDP.
Moreover, since the AVY (2016) work deals with data at the provincial and state level, there are
multiple observations that correspond to internal flows: for example, trade between Massachusetts
and Maine and trade between Iowa and Montana are both considered cases of internal trade. Notice
that the dataset I will be using for estimating scale economies in the European setting is at the
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country-level. For this reason, I have only one observation representing the overall internal trade
flow (i.e. Italy-Italy trade) for each sector.
Plugging equation (2.4) in (2.6) and substituting for ti,j,t from equation (2.5), it is possible to get
the following expression for Vi,j,t:
Vi,j,t =
[
ctxi,tmj,tτ
−σ
i,j
( ri,t
rj,t
)1−ρσ] 11+σφi,j
(1.2.7)
The latter can be plugged in (3.5) in order to solve for ti,j,t:
ti,j,t =
[
τi,j
( ri,t
rj,t
)ρ−φi,j
(ctxi,tmj,t)
φi,j
] 1
1+σφi,j
(1.2.8)
We can notice that trade costs turn out to be a function of τi,j , of the relative exchange rate
appreciation terms
(
ri,t
rj,t
)
and of multilateral resistances via fixed effect xi,t and mj,t. The effect
that each one of these components has on trade costs is a function of the scale elasticity φi,j , and
this makes the estimating equation different from the standard gravity one (2.4).
Substituting for ti,j,t in the gravity equation (2.3) and simplifying, it is possible to get the following
formula
Xki,j,t = (ctx
k
i,tm
k
j,t)
1+φi,j
1+σφi,j (τi,j)
1−σ
1+σφi,j
( ri,t
rj,t
) (ρ−φi,j)(1−σ)
1+σφi,j
(1.2.9)
After taking logs, the previous expression becomes
log(Xki,j,t) =
( 1 + φi,j
1 + σφi,j
)
log(ctx
k
i,tm
k
j,t) +
( 1− σ
1 + σφi,j
)
τi,j +
( (ρ− φi,j)(1− σ)
1 + σφi,j
)( ri,t
rj,t
)
(1.2.10)
which will be taken to the data up to an i.i.d. error.
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1.2.2 Testing for the Existence of Scale Elasticities
Equation (2.10) can be taken to the data using the following expression
Xki,j,t = exp[α0 + α1INTERNAL DISTi,i + α2INTERNAT DISTi,j+
δCONTIGUITYi,j + ζEXCH RATEi,j,t + βBORDERBi,j + θj,t + ηi,t] + εi,j,t
(1.2.11)
where the coefficients correspond to the structural parameters of the model in the following fashion:
α1 = γ1(1− σ)
α2 =
γ1(1− σ)
1 + σφ
δ =
γ2(1− σ)
1 + σφ
ζ =
( (ρ− φ)(1− σ)
1 + σφ
)
In fact, AVY (2016) show that, since the fixed effect terms enter equation (2.4) in a non-linear
fashion, it is possible to approximate them using a Taylor’s Series that gives us the following:
( 1 + φi,j
1 + σφi,j
)
log(xki,tm
k
j,t) = ηi,t + θj,t + βBORDERBi,j (1.2.12)
where βBORDER represents the direct effect on trade of being separated by an international border.
Notice that either one of the distance variables INTERNAL DISTi,i and INTERNAT DISTi,j
will always equal zero: in case of internal trade (i.e. Bi,j = 0), INTERNAT DISTi,j will equal
zero, whereas in case of international trade (i.e. Bi,j = 1) INTERNAL DISTi,j will equal zero.
This will allow to test whether the effect that distance, the empirical proxy for the trade costs, has
9
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on the trade flow is differentiated in case of internal or international trade, which is exactly what the
existence of scale economies would imply. In fact, it is possible to check for economies (diseconomies)
of scale by checking whether the difference between α1 and α2 is statistically different from zero.
In particular, in case of economies of scale, we will have that φ < 0 and therefore that |α1| < |α2|.
Moreover, I can get an estimate of the scale elasticity φ by using the above expressions for the αs
coefficient:
φ =
1
σ
(α1
α2
− 1
)
1.3 Data
The database used in this paper comprises the period from 1980 to 2013 and was constructed by
the author using different sources: TradeProd, Comext and Prodcom.
The TradeProd database (de Sousa et al., 2012) covers bilateral annual trade flows as well as
production over 26 industrial sectors (ISIC2 - 3digits). I will use this data for the period 1980 to
1995. For the subsequent period (1996-2013) I will use the Eurostat databases for trade (Comext)
and production (Prodcom), which I was able to convert to the ISIC2 3-digits classification. Details
are reported in the Appendix. As a result, I get a 23year-long time series for 26 manufacturing
sectors. Table 1.1 lists the sectors considered. The data report missing trade flows for 0.7% of the
country pair-year observations.
Notice that the Comext-Prodcom data is originally available at the product level. I will exploit this
feature in Section 5, where I will consider such a detailed level of disaggregation to check weather
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the degree of product homogeneity is a determinant for scale elasticities.
Distances are population-weighted and follow the CEPII notes by Mayer and Zignago (2011)2.
Exchange rate data at annual frequency come from the World Bank website3. Data on the level of
corruption in a given country are available come from the WGI database (Worldwide Governance
Indicators4). The database covers the period from 1996 to 2012 and reports the so-called control
of corruption index, which “reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ”capture” of the state by
elites and private interests”. Its frequency is biannual before 2002 and becomes annual from 2003
onwards. The index ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance.
The most corrupted countries in the sample are Croatia and Latvia in 1996 (-0.642), whereas the
least ones are Finland in 2000 and Denmark in 2006 (2.5).
My analysis will focus only on those European countries which are currently (2016) members of the
European Union. One possible concern could be that the sample period includes the introduction
of the Euro, which happened in 2001. Frankel and Rose (2002) among many others show that
the introduction of a common currency has significant effects on trade and income and this fact
could alter the meaning of the estimated coefficients. Nonetheless, including the whole sample in
the regressions does not alter the magnitude of the results, therefore I decided to consider the
entire 1980-2013 period5. Moreover, analyzing the whole sample allows me to consider the full EU
expansion, up until the last accession of Croatia in 2013.
2The CEPII database reports trade flows for Belgium and Luxembourg as if they were a unique country. For this
reason, I recomputed distances following the CEPII notes.
3http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.FCRF
4http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators
5I will test for Eurozone specific scale elasticities in Section 4.2
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1.4 Results
The results for the period 1980-2013 are reported in Tables 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6. As expected, the
estimated coefficient δˆ is positive when it is statistically significant, exception made for three sectors
(Beverages, Tobacco, and Other Chemicals): being adjacent increases the trade flow between two
countries. The opposite holds for the estimated coefficients associated with the distances variables
(αˆ1 and αˆ2): they are negative and significant at the 1% level for all sectors (apart from Tobacco,
Wearing Apparel and Petroleum Refineries): the higher the distance between trade partners, the
lower the trade flow.
Scale (dis)economies in trade costs will be present if αˆ1 and αˆ2 are statistically different: this
would mean that the internal distance plays a different role than the international one, i.e. that
there exist scale elasticities in trade costs when an international border needs to be crossed. Table
1.7 reports the estimated scale coefficient φˆ for each sector considered, obtained using the following
formula:
φˆ =
1
σ
( αˆ1
αˆ2
− 1
)
Trade costs exhibit economies of scale for all the 26 sectors considered, and the estimated φˆ is
statistically significant at the 1% level for 24 of them. There is strong cross-sectoral variation in the
coefficients, ranging from 1.95% in case of Tobacco to 0.14% in case of Transportation Equipment.
The average φˆ is -0.064: a 10% increase in trade volumes corresponds to a 0.64% decrease in trade
costs. This result is similar to the one found by AVY (2016), as they show that a 10% increase in
trade volumes would lower trade costs from US to Canada and from Canada to US by respectively
1.2% and 0.6% (they estimate direction-specific scale elasticities).
12
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Since I found significant economies of scale for the vast majority of the sectors included in my
sample, I represent trade costs using a simple function, which includes both a fixed (F ) a variable
(c) component:
t =
F
v
+ c
where t is the unitary trade cost and v is the trade volume. This formulation is consistent with the
literature: Roberts and Tybout (1997), among others, proved empirically the existence of fixed trade
costs, which have been assumed as a crucial determinant in the decision of exporting in theoretical
papers (Melitz, 2003). Then, it is possible to write the scale elasticity parameter φ as follows:
φ =
∂t
∂v
v
t
= − F
F + vc
(1.4.1)
Provided that fixed costs of exporting are positive, the scale parameter φ will be negative6. No-
tice that φ is decreasing in F : ∂φ∂F = − vc(F+vc)2 : the higher the fixed trade cost, the higher will be
the absolute value of the scale elasticity, and increasing trade volumes will entail a higher gain in
lowering trade costs. On the other hand, an increase in trade volumes will move the scale elasticity
closer to zero: ∂φ∂v =
cF
(F+vc)2 . This will result in larger markets exhibiting lower scale coefficients in
absolute value.
The fact that φ depends on trade volumes could explain why the sector-specific scale elasticities I
estimate do not align with those obtained by AVY (2016). For instance, they find constant returns
to scale for Wood Products and Petroleum Refineries whereas the φˆ I estimate for those sectors
are among the highest parameters, in absolute value, that I find (-0.108 and -0.156 respectively).
This could be given by the relative size of sectors in North America, probably very different than in
6Notice that I took an agnostic perspective when testing for the existence of scale elasticities, as the estimating
equation allows for decreasing returns to scale (φ > 0) as well.
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Europe. In fact, both Wood Products and Petroleum Refineries are characterized by very high and
concentrated trade volumes in the US-Canadian trade and this could be responsible for driving the
elasticity very close to zero7.
Further research, analyzing the sectoral composition of European trade and comparing it to the
North American one, will hopefully shed light on this puzzle. As a matter of fact, this finding poses
a challenge to the assumption of uniformity of the scale parameter that I initially made. For this
reason, in the next section I will show that uniformity is surely an approximation, which however
does not seem too strong to be made.
1.4.1 Country size ad Scale Elasticities
So far I assumed uniformity in the scale elasticity, i.e. I imposed that the gain from trade volumes
is the same across all country-pairs and can vary only across the sectoral dimension. However, the
high degree of cross-sectoral variation in the estimated coefficients, together with a comparison of
the coefficients with the one by AVY (2016), seem to suggest that uniformity may be too strong
of an assumption. In this section, I will slightly modify the model and test its validity, allowing
scale elasticities to differ depending on country size. In particular, I partition the sample in two
subgroups, large and small, according to two different criteria: population and GDP8. Countries
are then divided in two groups depending on whether their size is above (large) or below (small)
the sample median. Therefore, I am now assuming that the scale parameter is the same across
destinations having the same country size (for each sector k).
7The estimated scale elasticities for Petroleum, Tobacco and Wearing Apparel could suffer from a mis-specification
of the trade cost function, as the positive coefficient for INTERNAL DIST suggests
8These variables being time-varying, I considered their average over the sample for each country. Data on population
and GDP (at constant 2010$ prices) were collected from the WorldBank website.
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Country size seems the most natural dimension to challenge the assumption of uniformity with.
In fact, if uniformity is not a good approximation, I will observe lower scale elasticities (in absolute
value) for larger countries. First of all, this would happen because trade volumes v are higher for
larger markets, hence the scale elasticity should be closer to zero for them (see Section 4). Moreover,
should trade result from the creation of buyer-seller links a’ la Chaney (2014), the probability of
finding a buyer in a specific area needs to be scaled by the size of that location: firms are more
likely to export to countries where there are more potential business contacts to be made. Since
the creation of such contacts involves only the extensive margin of trade, in my setting this would
correspond to scaling the fixed component of trade costs, making it less costly to export to larger
markets (and, again, shifting the elasticity closer to zero). For both these reasons, if uniformity
across all country pairs has to be rejected by the data, then it seems plausible that scale coefficients
will be lower (in absolute value) for larger destinations.
The model will be modified as follows
Xki,j,t = exp[α0 + α1INTERNAL DISTi,i + α2INTERNAT DIST BIGi,j+
α3INTERNAT DIST SMALLi,j + δ1CONTIG BIGi,j + δ2CONTIG SMALLi,j+
ζ1EXCH RATE BIGi,j,t + ζ2EXCH RATE SMALLi,j,t + βBORDERBB BIGi,j
βBORDERSB SMALLi,j + θj,t + ηi,t] + εi,j,t
(1.4.2)
and therefore I will be able to back out the following parameters
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φBIG =
1
σ
(α1
α2
− 1
)
φSMALL =
1
σ
(α1
α3
− 1
)
Table 1.8 reports the estimated scale elasticities in aggregate terms, i.e. obtained using bilateral
trade flows at the country level disregarding the sectoral dimension. As expected, the estimated
parameters are higher (in absolute value) when considering flows towards a small trade partner,
both in terms of population (20% higher) and of GDP (10% higher). However, when looking at the
estimates obtained at the sectoral level, I find that φBIG and φSMALL are significantly different only
for a very small minority of the 26 sectors considered. Moreover, even though statistically different,
these coefficients have basically the same magnitude.
Not having found compelling evidence at the sectoral level for the rejection of the uniformity
assumption, I will maintain it in the remainder of the analysis, in order to ease the notation and
the interpretation of the coefficients. Notice that all regressions will be run sector by sector, thus
allowing heterogeneity in economies of scale across industries.
1.4.2 Scale Elasticities and the EU Expansion
The European Union is currently (2016) made up of 28 countries. Its process of creation and
expansion lasted 62 year: from the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
in 1951, followed by the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, to the
accession of the last member state to join (Croatia, 2013). The European Union incorporated the
pre-existing European Communities in 1993, according to the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty.
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Table 1.2 tracks the expansion of the European Union over time.
The main purpose of the creation of the EEC was to promote economic integration among member
states. The EEC was indeed established as a customs union. However, this measure was considered
insufficient and this led to the Single Market Programme, starting from 1992. It is established that
“The Union shall comprise a customs union which shall cover all trade in goods and which shall
involve the prohibition between Member States of customs duties on imports and exports and of all
charges having equivalent effect, and the adoption of a common customs tariff in their relations with
third countries.”9. Quantitative restrictions on imports and exports between member states are also
prohibited.10
Apart from tariff and non-tariff barriers, trade costs comprise obstacles such as information costs
and legal costs (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). Joining the European Union should decreases
the asymmetry between countries with respect to these frictions as well: for example, cross-border
insolvency disputes involving member states are regulated by the EU Insolvency Regulation, which
was adopted in 2000. We expect common membership to facilitate trade. In particular, fixed trade
costs should be lower when trade partners are both EU members, exactly because they share a
common set of laws and practices. Therefore, the gain from an increase in trade volumes, which
could be considered a proxy of the frequency at which transactions take place, should be lower. As
a consequence, scale elasticities should be lower as well when both countries belong to the EU.
9Article 28 TFEU
10Articles 34 to 36 TFEU
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Testing for European Union elasticities
In the second specification, I will consider a version of equation (2.11) that allows me to take into
account possible differences implied by the expansion of the European Union. In particular
ti,j,t = τi,j
( ri,t
rj,t
)ρj
V φi,j,t
The main difference with equation (2.5) is given by the fact that the scale elasticity coefficient is
now time varying. In fact, I am assuming that
φi,j,t = Bi,j [φ1 + φ2Ui,j,t]
where Ui,j,t takes value 1 if i and j are separated by a non-EU border at time t, i.e. if at least one
of the two is not a member of the European Union at time t. As a consequence, φi,j,t will equal 0 in
case of internal trade, it will equal φ1 in case of trade between EU members and it will equal φ1 +φ2
if at least one of the two countries is not a EU member. This will allow me to see whether scale
economies in trade costs are independent from the EU membership or are affected by it. Notice
the t subscript: the same couple of countries will have a different scale coefficient at different points
in time as the EU expands. Figure 1.1 depicts the example of Spain, which became a member in 1986.
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I estimate the following equation
Xki,j,t = exp[α0 + α1INTERNAL DISTi,i + α2INTERNAT DIST EUi,j,t+
α3INTERNAT DIST NONEUi,j,t + δ1CONTIGUITY EUi,j+
δ2CONTIGUITY NONEUi,j + ζ1EXCH RATE EUi,j,t+
ζ2EXCH RATE NONEUi,j,t + βBORDEREUBi,j(Ui,j,t = 0)+
βBORDERNONEUBi,j(Ui,j,t = 1) + θj,t + ηi,t] + εi,j,t
(1.4.3)
where the coefficients correspond to the structural parameters of the model in the following fashion:
α1 = γ1(1− σ)
α2 =
γ1(1− σ)
1 + σφ1
α3 =
γ1(1− σ)
1 + σ(φ1 + φ2)
δ1 =
γ2(1− σ)
1 + σφ1
δ2 =
γ2(1− σ)
1 + σ(φ1 + φ2)
ζ1 =
( (ρ− φ1)(1− σ)
1 + σφ1
)
ζ2 =
( (ρ− φ1 − φ2)(1− σ)
1 + σ(φ1 + φ2)
)
It is possible to test for economies (diseconomies) of scale by checking whether the differences
between α1 and α2 and α1 and α3 are statistically different from zero. In case of economies of scale,
we will have that φ1 < 0 and φ1 + φ2 < 0 therefore that |α2| < |α3|. Moreover, α2 and α3 will be
statistically different when φ2 is statistically different from zero, i.e. when economies of scale are
different when at least one of the trade partners is not a member of the EU. We can also back out
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the scale elasticities φ1 and φ2 using the expressions for the αs coefficients. In fact,
φ1 =
1
σ
(α1
α2
− 1
)
φ2 =
α1
σ
( 1
α3
− 1
α2
)
Results
The estimated φ1 and φ2 are reported in Table 1.9. Aggregating across all goods, I find no statis-
tically significant difference in scale elasticities when one of the trade partners is not a member of
the EU. This means that, on average, fixed trade costs when trading with a fellow EU member are
not different than those met when trading with a country that in not in the Union yet.
Breaking down the results by sectors, however, I find that there is heterogeneity: scale elasticities
when crossing the EU border are about 50% higher on average for a minority of sectors. These
sectors are Beverages, Textiles, Wearing Apparel, Pottery, Glass&Prod, FabricMetPr, Machin.,
Machin.Electric, PlasticProd and TransportEquip. Interestingly, I find that seven of these sectors11
rank above the median in terms of ‘weight to value” ratio, i.e. the weight in kilograms per euro
shipped, in average terms across all years and country-pairs. Moreover, all sectors above the 75th
percentile in this ranking, i.e. those having the highest ‘weight to value” ratio, exhibit significantly
higher scale elasticities when crossing the EU border. This means that there might have been a
decline in fixed trade costs due to the EU expansion, but only for those goods that are heavy to
transport12.
11Machin.,Beverages,Textiles,Machin.Electric, PlasticProd, TransportEquip. and FabricMetPr
12I computed the ‘weight to value” ratio for 19 of the 26 sectors considered in the main regressions using trade data
from Eurostat (available from 1988 onward), reporting volume (in tons) and value per product category. In order
to do so, I followed the procedure by Chen (2004), who constructs a sector-specific variable averaged across all
country pairs i, j.
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Interestingly, I find that scale elasticities are lower in absolute value if both the trade partners are
among the six EU founders: the estimated coefficient is 0.68% whereas it is 0.83% in case at least
one of the trade partner is a “new” members. Using a similar procedure, I found that trade within
the Eurozone entails higher gains from volume increase than trade between EU members that do
not share the same currency, differently from what we would expect: on average, scale elasticities
are 0.94% when selling to a Eurozone member and 0.79% when selling to a EU member not in the
Eurozone.
As a robustness check, I can see whether the scale elasticities are larger when considering trade
with non European countries. In particular, I will consider USA, Russia, China and Japan. Results
are reported in Table 1.1013. The estimated coefficient χ1 refers to intra-European trade whereas
χ1 + χ2 refers to trade with one of the non-European countries considered. As a consequence, if
χ2 is statistically significant we can conclude that the scale effects are significantly different when
considering extra-European trade flows. Clearly, we expect scale economies to be either unchanged or
greater in absolute value when trading with one of these extra-European countries. On average, this
is exactly what I find: trade between European countries entail scale economies whose magnitude is
0.69%, whereas trade with an extra-European destination entails scale economies that are 26% higher
(χ1+χ2=-0.69-0.18=-0.87%). For eleven sectors, the estimated χˆ2 are significant and negative: gains
from increases in volume are bigger when at least one country is not European. This is likely due to
lower trade volumes when trading with countries that are much farther away than European ones.
13Two sectors are excluded because there are not sufficient observations withing country-year pairs for the multilateral
resistance fixed effect to yield consistent estimates.
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1.5 Investigating Scale Elasticities
1.5.1 Product Differentiation
In Section 4, I showed that the estimated φs exhibit a strong cross-sectoral variation. This could
be due to differences in the size of markets, as I previously discussed, but it could also be a con-
sequence of different product characteristics, responsible for different parameters in the trade cost
function assumed in Section 4. For instance, the degree of product homogeneity could play a role
in this respect. Rauch (1999) shows that proximity and cultural links such as common language
and colonial ties have stronger effects in the market for differentiated goods. This finding provides
empirical evidence for the existence of a “search” model of international trade: when goods are not
homogeneous, but differ along dimensions such as quality, prices are not completely informative and
markets are substituted by networks: exchanges happen after a buyer-seller connection has formed
(Chaney (2014) develops a model on the formation of such networks). For this reason, cultural links
and proximity play a greater role for these commodities.
If scale effects are the consequence, in aggregate terms, of the existence of buyer-seller links a’
la Chaney (2014) and if informational asymmetries play a role in this respect, φ should be higher
(in absolute value) when products are differentiated, because the creation of a relationship between
buyer and seller is crucial when there are some non-standardized characteristics of the good, such as
its quality. On the other hand, the fixed costs due to the creation of such links should be negligible
for goods traded in organized markets, such as petroleum or gold. Therefore, I expect the scale
coefficient to be lower (in absolute value) for those commodities.
I consider the more conservative classification by Rauch (1999), who divides goods in three cat-
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egories according to their SITC Rev.2 classification: homogeneous goods traded in organized ex-
changes, homogeneous goods not traded in organized exchanges, but characterized by the presence
of a “reference price”, and differentiated goods. Notice that the Rauch classification involves goods
and not sectors. For this reason, I will use the more disaggregated Eurostat dataset, available at the
product-level. Because of this, I can consider only a subset of the main data (from 1996 onward).
This data is available at the CN (Combined Nomenclature) level and has been converted to the
SITC Rev.2 level following the steps described in the Appendix.
I will run regression (2.11) interacting the INTERNATIONAL DIST variable with a dummy
taking different values according to the different degree of homogeneity of the product considered.
The estimating regression is as follows:
Xki,j,k,t = exp[α0 + α1INTERNAL DISTi,i + α2INTERNAT DISTi,j+
α3(INTERNAT DISTi,j ×DEGREE HOMOGk)+
δCONTIGUITYi,j + ζEXCH RATEi,j,t + βBORDERBi,j + θj,t + ηi,t] + εi,j,k,t
(1.5.1)
None of the resulting φs is statistically significant. This could be due to the fact that I am restrict-
ing too much the sample: on average, I could match each of the 26 sectors with five different product
codes only. However, when considering the entire Comext-Prodcom database (without limiting my
attention to the 26 manufacturing sectors considered in the main regression), my results confirm
the existence of statistically significant economies of scale in trade costs, still there is no connection
between the degree of product homogeneity and the scale coefficient (see Table 1.11). Actually, I
find that there are scale economies in trade costs for homogeneous goods only, for which frictions
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should be minimal.
I conclude that the degree of product homogeneity does not seem to explain the cross-sectoral
variation in a manner consistent with the existence of informational frictions. A plausible expla-
nation, then, could be that the volume of goods traded in organized exchanges is smaller than the
volume of differentiated goods, possibly compensating for the difference in fixed trade costs.
Using a similar approach, I explored the weight to value ratio as a possible product characteristic
directly affecting scale coefficients, as well as regulatory barriers such as non tariff barriers and
technical barriers to trade, which are heterogeneous across products and could rationalize the cross-
sectoral variation obtained from the main regression. None of these seems to explain the result,
again pointing at differences in volumes as important determinants for scale elasticities. Further
research on this topic will hopefully provide some additional insights.
1.5.2 Corruption
Institutional variables such as the level of corruption have been shown to affect international trade
flows. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) show that corruption acts as an hidden tax, whose negative
impact on international trade has about the same magnitude as the one of tariffs. Some studies pro-
vide evidence on how corruption can be pervasive at some countries’ customs (see Parayno (1999) for
Philippines). More recently, Dutt and Traca (2010) proved that there exist a non-linear relationship
between corruption and trade: when the tariff level is low, corruption harms trade (extortion effect),
whereas it enhances it when the level of protection is higher (evasion effect).
Scale elasticities measure the extent to which higher flows are reflected in lower trade costs. If
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the level of corruption affected trade costs, I would expect it to increase their fixed component and
hence to increase scale elasticities as well (in absolute value). To check for this hypothesis, I will
run the following regression
Xki,j,t = exp[α0 + α1INTERNAL DISTi,i + α2INTERNAT DISTi,j+
α3INTERNAT DISTi,j × CORRUPj,t + γCORRUPj,t + δCONTIGUITYi,j+
ζEXCH RATEi,j,t + βBORDERBi,j + θj,t + ηi,t] + εi,j,k,t
(1.5.2)
Table 1.12 (Column (1)) reports the results. The corruption index is absorbed by the importer-
time fixed effect that controls for one of the multilateral resistance terms, hence this equation
does not measure the direct effect of corruption on trade. Interestingly, the interaction with the
INTERNATIONAL DIST variable is positive and significant: this means corruption depresses
more trade on longer distances (recall that the corruption index is negative for country whose level
of governance is weak). As a consequence, scale elasticities are higher (in absolute value) the higher
the level of corruption measured in the importing country. To give an idea of the magnitude of the
estimate, consider the following example: selling manufacturing goods to Romania in 2000 (whose
corruption index, -0.477, is the highest in the regression subsample) entails a scale elasticity of
0.38%, whereas exporting the same additional quantity to Denmark in 2006 (2.5 is the corruption
index) implies more than half the gain in terms of trade costs reduction (0.16%). The rationale is
that higher trade volumes could reflect an higher number of transactions, which are clearly most
beneficial towards trade costs reductions when the level of corruption of custom officials is high14.
14This analysis assumes the general level of corruption of a country, measured by the WGI index, to be positively
correlated with the one of customs officials.
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Moreover, the level of corruption matters independently on the EU membership of the trade part-
ners (see Column (2) in 1.12). Even though the estimates of the interaction coefficients are statisti-
cally different when both countries are EU members (Bothmembers = 1) or not (Bothmembers =
0), the estimated φ are basically the same. For instance, consider a good being sold from Czech
Republic to its neighboring country, Poland, either in 2003 or in 2009. The index of corruption in
Poland was 0.38 in 2003 and 0.37, basically unchanged, in 2009. Given the estimated coefficients, a
100% increase in imports from Czech Republic implied a 3.3% decrease in trade costs in 2003, when
none of the country was a EU member, and a 3.2% decrease in 2009, when both countries were EU
members (they both joined in 2004). I conclude that what matters for scale economies is the level
of corruption per se and it is not mitigated by the EU expansion.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I showed the existence of scale economies in European international trade for the
totality of manufacturing sectors considered over a 23-year long time period (1980-2013). At the
beginning of this period, the members of what would have become the European Union were only
nine, whereas they reach the number of 28 in the last year considered. I explore the possibility
that the EU expansion could have changed such scale economies, but the data reject this hypothesis
in aggregate terms.15. When estimating sector-specific elasticities, however, I find that a minority
of them were altered by the EU expansion in a way consistent with the reduction of fixed trade costs.
Scale economies in trade costs are not linked to sector-specific informational frictions, at least
as they are measured by the degree of product homogeneity. Institutional characteristics of the
15The inclusion of extra-European countries as a robustness check, however, confirms the validity of my approach:
extra-European elasticities are on average much higher than European one.
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destination country, however, play a role: the higher the level of corruption in the importing country,
the higher the gain from a trade volume increase, independently from the EU membership of the
country considered.
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Table 1.1: List of Sectors
Food products Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products
Beverages Rubber products
Tobacco Plastic products
Textiles Pottery, china, earthenware
Wearing apparel, except footwear Glass and products
Leather products Other non-metallic mineral products
Footwear, except rubber or plastic Iron and steel
Wood products, except furniture Non-ferrous metals
Furniture, except metal Fabricated metal products
Paper and products Machinery, except electrical
Printing and publishing Machinery, electric
Industrial chemicals Transport equipment
Other chemicals Professional and scientific equipment
Petroleum refineries
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Table 1.2: EU Expansion
Name Accession Name Accession
Belgium Founder Sweden 1-Jan-95
France Founder Cyprus 1-May-04
Germany Founder Czech Rep. 1-May-04
Italy Founder Estonia 1-May-04
Luxembourg Founder Hungary 1-May-04
Netherlands Founder Latvia 1-May-04
Denmark 1-Jan-73 Lithuania 1-May-04
Ireland 1-Jan-73 Malta 1-May-04
UK 1-Jan-73 Poland 1-May-04
Greece 1-Jan-81 Slovakia 1-May-04
Portugal 1-Jan-86 Slovenia 1-May-04
Spain 1-Jan-86 Bulgaria 1-Jan-07
Austria 1-Jan-95 Romania 1-Jan-07
Finland 1-Jan-95 Croatia 1-Jul-13
Figure 1.1: EU Elasticities: An Example
29
Chapter 1 Scale Economies in European Trade
T
ab
le
1.
3:
E
st
im
at
ed
C
o
effi
ci
en
ts
-
A
F
o
o
d
P
ro
d
u
ct
s
B
ev
er
ag
es
T
ob
ac
co
T
ex
ti
le
s
W
ea
ri
n
g
ap
p
ar
el
L
ea
th
er
p
r
F
o
ot
w
ea
r
In
te
rn
a
l
D
is
t
-0
.4
83
∗∗
∗
-1
.5
47
∗∗
∗
0.
81
8∗
∗∗
-0
.8
24
∗∗
∗
0.
23
4∗
∗∗
-1
.1
28
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
30
∗∗
∗
(-
6.
46
)
(-
18
.6
4)
(4
.0
8)
(-
10
.1
1)
(2
.9
8)
(-
1
5.
25
)
(-
11
.0
1)
In
te
rn
at
D
is
t
-1
.6
78
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
66
∗∗
∗
-2
.2
46
∗∗
∗
-1
.2
06
∗∗
∗
-1
.3
71
∗∗
∗
-1
.4
74
∗∗
∗
-1
.5
77
∗∗
∗
(-
32
.5
3
)
(-
23
.8
7)
(-
16
.7
9)
(-
23
.8
3)
(-
23
.0
8)
(-
25
.9
3)
(-
24
.3
5)
C
on
ti
gu
it
y
0.
30
7∗
∗∗
-0
.2
44
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
45
∗∗
0.
25
7∗
∗∗
0.
25
5∗
∗∗
0.
03
81
0.
21
4
∗∗
∗
(5
.6
5)
(-
3.
40
)
(-
2.
01
)
(3
.9
9)
(3
.8
4)
(0
.6
4)
(4
.1
4)
E
x
ch
.
ra
te
0
.4
20
∗∗
∗
11
.9
7
-1
.5
74
∗∗
∗
0.
39
7∗
∗∗
-0
.6
80
∗∗
∗
1.
33
9
-0
.9
59
∗∗
∗
(5
.6
1)
(1
.5
1)
(-
10
.8
1)
(3
.3
9)
(-
6.
06
)
(1
.5
2)
(-
7.
36
)
B
or
d
er
d
u
m
m
y
4.
27
6∗
∗∗
-1
.5
81
∗∗
∗
14
.0
5∗
∗∗
0.
32
6
7.
41
1∗
∗∗
0.
67
8∗
∗
1.
51
8∗
∗
(1
0.
27
)
(-
3.
99
)
(9
.0
4)
(0
.8
9)
(1
4.
24
)
(1
.9
7)
(2
.4
9)
N
95
48
86
50
52
62
96
92
94
51
88
24
77
62
R
2
0.
99
0.
99
0.
99
0.
97
0.
96
0.
99
0.
99
t
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
∗
p
<
0
.1
0
,
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
5
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0
.0
1
30
Chapter 1 Scale Economies in European Trade
T
ab
le
1.
4:
E
st
im
at
ed
C
o
effi
ci
en
ts
-
B
W
o
o
d
p
ro
d
.
F
u
rn
it
.
P
ap
er
&
p
ro
d
P
ri
n
t&
p
u
b
l.
In
d
.c
h
em
.
O
th
er
.C
h
em
.
In
te
rn
al
D
is
t
-0
.3
6
6∗
∗∗
-0
.8
20
∗∗
∗
-0
.5
97
∗∗
∗
-0
.5
00
∗∗
∗
-0
.8
65
∗∗
∗
-0
.5
46
∗∗
∗
(-
6.
13
)
(-
11
.6
5)
(-
10
.6
6)
(-
6.
17
)
(-
9.
77
)
(-
11
.6
8)
In
te
rn
at
D
is
t
-1
.4
94
∗∗
∗
-1
.9
92
∗∗
∗
-1
.3
76
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
99
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
78
∗∗
∗
-1
.9
32
∗∗
∗
(-
33
.8
3)
(-
31
.8
6)
(-
36
.7
9)
(-
25
.6
6)
(-
42
.2
9)
(-
55
.3
4)
C
on
ti
gu
it
y
0
.6
00
∗∗
∗
0.
19
2∗
∗∗
0.
36
5∗
∗∗
0.
47
9∗
∗∗
0.
12
1∗
∗∗
-0
.1
94
∗∗
∗
(1
0
.5
6)
(3
.2
1)
(8
.2
2)
(6
.6
2)
(2
.8
1)
(-
4.
92
)
E
x
ch
.
ra
te
1
.1
87
∗∗
∗
1.
20
9∗
∗∗
1.
17
2∗
∗∗
1.
03
2∗
∗∗
1.
11
3∗
∗∗
1.
45
1∗
∗∗
(1
0
.0
1)
(1
4.
42
)
(1
1.
53
)
(9
.5
3)
(1
0.
68
)
(1
1.
67
)
B
or
d
er
d
u
m
m
y
3.
8
12
∗∗
∗
4.
94
1∗
∗∗
2.
50
2∗
∗∗
3.
82
0∗
∗∗
4.
03
6∗
∗∗
6.
46
1∗
∗∗
(1
3.
5
8)
(1
2.
59
)
(8
.7
1)
(8
.9
2)
(8
.0
6)
(2
2.
05
)
N
8
91
7
87
24
90
19
90
13
95
02
92
09
R
2
0.
99
0.
99
0.
99
0.
99
0.
96
0.
99
t
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
∗
p
<
0
.1
0
,
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
5
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0
.0
1
31
Chapter 1 Scale Economies in European Trade
T
ab
le
1.
5:
E
st
im
at
ed
C
o
effi
ci
en
ts
-
C
P
et
ro
l.
re
f.
R
u
b
b
er
p
ro
d
.
P
la
st
ic
p
ro
d
.
P
ot
te
ry
G
la
ss
&
p
ro
d
.
N
on
.M
et
al
.M
in
.P
ro
d
In
te
rn
al
D
is
t
0.
20
1
∗∗
-1
.1
17
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
39
∗∗
∗
-1
.4
90
∗∗
∗
-1
.5
63
∗∗
∗
-1
.4
44
∗∗
∗
(1
.9
7)
(-
17
.5
6)
(-
9.
16
)
(-
16
.1
4)
(-
22
.0
5)
(-
13
.8
1)
In
te
rn
a
t
D
is
t
-2
.1
57
∗∗
∗
-1
.4
08
∗∗
∗
-1
.3
51
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
90
∗∗
∗
-1
.7
91
∗∗
∗
-1
.8
22
∗∗
∗
(-
25
.3
2)
(-
22
.8
5)
(-
20
.4
4)
(-
21
.5
8)
(-
35
.0
2)
(-
26
.6
4)
C
on
ti
gu
it
y
-0
.0
76
0
0.
18
9∗
∗∗
0.
39
8∗
∗∗
0.
15
8∗
∗
0.
19
7∗
∗∗
0.
17
5∗
∗
(-
1.
1
1)
(3
.4
7)
(4
.9
7)
(2
.1
0)
(3
.7
4)
(2
.0
6)
E
x
ch
.
ra
te
1.
21
3∗
∗∗
0.
71
5∗
∗∗
0.
96
0∗
∗∗
1.
24
7∗
∗∗
-0
.5
99
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
92
1
(2
8.
12
)
(7
.2
0)
(1
1.
42
)
(8
.0
1)
(-
3.
10
)
(-
0.
56
)
B
or
d
er
d
u
m
m
y
11
.0
7∗
∗∗
0.
23
0
0.
45
0
-0
.6
64
0.
09
63
0.
14
1
(2
0.
31
)
(0
.5
7)
(0
.7
9)
(-
1.
48
)
(0
.2
4)
(0
.3
0)
N
44
09
91
13
91
96
80
39
87
27
90
00
R
2
0.
99
0.
98
0.
97
0.
99
0.
98
0.
99
t
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
∗
p
<
0
.1
0
,
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
5
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0
.0
1
32
Chapter 1 Scale Economies in European Trade
T
ab
le
1.
6:
E
st
im
at
ed
C
o
effi
ci
en
ts
-
D
Ir
o
n
&
st
ee
l
N
on
-f
er
r
m
et
F
ab
ri
c
m
et
p
r
M
ac
h
in
M
ac
h
in
,
el
ec
tr
ic
T
ra
n
s
E
q
u
ip
P
ro
fe
ss
E
q
u
ip
In
te
rn
a
l
D
is
t
-0
.8
48
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
29
∗∗
∗
-1
.1
69
∗∗
∗
-1
.1
98
∗∗
∗
-0
.7
79
∗∗
∗
-1
.3
16
∗∗
∗
0.
20
4
(-
14
.0
8)
(-
9.
32
)
(-
13
.0
5)
(-
20
.8
8)
(-
15
.8
6)
(-
17
.0
3)
(1
.0
9)
In
te
rn
at
D
is
t
-1
.4
12
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
09
∗∗
∗
-1
.5
85
∗∗
∗
-1
.3
58
∗∗
∗
-1
.2
73
∗∗
∗
-1
.4
60
∗∗
∗
-1
.5
31
∗∗
∗
(-
29
.2
6)
(-
3
3.
30
)
(-
29
.1
0)
(-
39
.2
6)
(-
30
.7
0)
(-
28
.9
6)
(-
22
.8
0)
C
o
n
ti
gu
it
y
0.
30
3∗
∗∗
0.
1
92
∗∗
∗
0.
37
5∗
∗∗
-0
.0
08
78
0.
04
30
0.
21
9∗
∗∗
-0
.0
50
4
(6
.2
0)
(3
.5
9)
(4
.7
2)
(-
0.
24
)
(0
.9
9)
(4
.6
0)
(-
0.
84
)
E
x
ch
.
ra
te
-0
.2
49
∗
-0
.3
11
∗∗
1.
08
5∗
∗∗
1.
03
0∗
∗∗
1.
42
7∗
∗∗
1.
10
4∗
∗∗
0.
82
8∗
∗∗
(-
1.
94
)
(-
2.
51
)
(1
3.
76
)
(1
6.
92
)
(1
1.
58
)
(6
.0
2)
(4
.3
4)
B
or
d
er
d
u
m
m
y
1.
18
5∗
∗∗
2
.7
11
∗∗
∗
0.
68
8
-0
.2
48
1.
02
0∗
∗∗
-0
.2
13
9.
83
0
∗∗
∗
(3
.5
9)
(4
.9
4)
(1
.3
2)
(-
0.
86
)
(3
.6
3)
(-
0.
53
)
(8
.5
2)
N
79
40
83
64
95
33
97
49
96
31
92
64
90
79
R
2
0
.9
9
0.
97
0.
97
0.
99
0.
99
0.
98
0.
86
t
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
∗
p
<
0
.1
0
,
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
5
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0
.0
1
33
Chapter 1 Scale Economies in European Trade
Table 1.7: Estimated Scale Elasticities
Sector φ S.E.
Aggregate -0.064*** (0.004)
Food Products -0.102*** (0.006)
Beverages -0.01* (0.006)
Tobacco -0.195*** (0.012)
Textiles -0.045*** (0.008)
Wearing apparel -0.167*** (0.008)
Leatherpr -0.034*** (0.006)
Footwear -0.059*** (0.008)
WoodProd. -0.108*** (0.005)
Furnit. -0.084*** (0.004)
Paper&prod -0.081*** (0.005)
Print&publ. -0.101*** (0.006)
Ind.chem. -0.069*** (0.007)
OtherChem. -0.102*** (0.003)
Petrol.ref. -0.156*** (0.007)
RubberProd. -0.03*** (0.006)
PlasticProd. -0.044*** (0.01)
Pottery -0.017*** (0.006)
Glass&prod. -0.018*** (0.005)
Non-metal.min.prod. -0.03*** (0.007)
Iron&steel -0.057*** (0.005)
Non-ferrMet -0.06*** (0.008)
FabricMetPr -0.038*** (0.008)
Machin -0.017*** (0.005)
Machin,Electric -0.055*** (0.005)
TransEquip -0.014** (0.007)
ProfessEquip -0.162*** (0.017)
Table 1.8: Estimated Scale Elasticities - Big VS Small destinations
Criterion φLARGE φSMALL
Population -0.075*** -0.090***
(0.006) (0.005)
GDP -0.086*** -0.095***
(0.005) (0.004)
N 13029 13017
R2 0.99 0.99
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Table 1.9: Estimated Scale Elasticities - EU Expansion
Sector φ1 φ2
Aggregate -0.073*** 0.002
(0.004) (0.002)
Food Products -0.126*** 0.003
(0.006) (0.001)
Beverages -0.02*** -0.036***
(0.007) (0.005)
Tobacco -0.227*** -0.793
(0.016) (0.834)
Textiles -0.064*** -0.016***
(0.009) (0.005)
Wearing apparel -0.176*** -0.038**
(0.009) (0.015)
Leatherpr -0.037*** -0.004
(0.006) (0.004)
Footwear -0.104*** 0.001
(0.008) (0.003)
WoodProd. -0.097*** 0.007
(0.005) (0.002)
Furnit. -0.085*** 0.022
(0.005) (0.002)
Paper&prod -0.082*** 0.006
(0.005) (0.002)
Print&publ. -0.111*** 0.004
(0.007) (0.002)
Ind.chem. -0.085*** 0.015
(0.008) (0.003)
OtherChem. -0.108*** 0.023
(0.003) (0.001)
Sector φ1 φ2
Petrol.ref. -0.13*** 0.019
(0.007) (0.01)
RubberProd. -0.035*** -0.01*
(0.007) (0.006)
PlasticProd. -0.039*** -0.017**
(0.012) (0.008)
Pottery -0.031*** -0.018***
(0.006) (0.005)
Glass&prod. -0.021*** -0.01**
(0.006) (0.005)
Non-metal.min.prod. -0.037*** -0.012**
(0.007) (0.005)
Iron&steel -0.075*** 0.002
(0.006) (0.003)
Non-ferrMet -0.085*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.004)
FabricMetPr -0.034*** -0.013**
(0.009) (0.006)
Machin -0.004 -0.035***
(0.007) (0.005)
Machin,Electric -0.055*** -0.015***
(0.006) (0.004)
TransEquip -0.012 -0.036***
(0.009) (0.007)
ProfessEquip -0.174*** -0.076
(0.017) (0.075)
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Table 1.10: Estimated Scale Elasticities - Extra European Countries
Sector χ1 χ2
Aggregate -0.069*** -0.018***
(0.004) (0.003)
Food Products -0.11*** -0.003
(0.006) (0.002)
Tobacco -0.193*** -0.098*
(0.012) (0.055)
Textiles -0.044*** 0.029
(0.007) (0.016)
Wearing apparel -0.146*** -0.004
(0.007) (0.009)
Leatherpr -0.024*** 21.254
(0.005) (434.768)
Footwear -0.028*** 0.217
(0.009) (0.239)
WoodProd. -0.103*** 0.022
(0.004) (0.009)
Furnit. -0.084*** 0.032
(0.004) (0.015)
Paper&prod -0.083*** 0.044
(0.005) (0.015)
Print&publ. -0.109*** -0.009***
(0.005) (0.003)
Ind.chem. -0.077*** -0.018***
(0.008) (0.003)
Sector χ1 χ2
OtherChem. -0.106*** -0.005**
(0.003) (0.002)
Petrol.ref. -0.157*** 0.003
(0.007) (0.002)
RubberProd. -0.041*** 0.081
(0.007) (0.048)
PlasticProd. -0.055*** -0.016
(0.011) (0.011)
Pottery -0.018*** -0.039***
(0.006) (0.009)
Glass&prod. -0.024*** -0.011
(0.005) (0.012)
Non-metal.min.prod. -0.026*** 0.109
(0.006) (0.052)
Iron&steel -0.06*** -0.015**
(0.005) (0.007)
FabricMetPr -0.041*** -0.021***
(0.008) (0.007)
Machin -0.02*** -0.051***
(0.006) (0.005)
Machin,Electric -0.064*** -0.04***
(0.005) (0.004)
TransEquip -0.024*** -0.066***
(0.007) (0.006)
ProfessEquip -0.22*** 0.03
(0.027) (0.012)
Table 1.11: Estimated Scale Elasticities - Rauch Classification
Coefficient Estimate
φdifferentiated -0.004
(0.007)
φref.priced -0.010
(0.007)
φorganized -0.016**
(0.006)
N 494401
R2 0.19
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Table 1.12: Estimated Scale Elasticities - Corruption Level
(1) (2)
Internal dist -1.164*** -1.141***
(-16.81) (-16.26)
International dist -1.532*** -1.515***
(-32.24) (-31.42)
Corruption impo × International dist 0.0826***
(-17.69)
Corruption imp × International dist × Bothmembers 0.0819***
(17.59)
Corruption imp × International dist × (1-Bothmembers) 0.0616***
(8.05)
N 2796 2796
R2 0.99 0.99
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix
Creation of the main dataset
Prodcom reports data according to the Nace Rev.2 classification. The Comext data is instead clas-
sified according to the CN (Combined Nomenclature) code, which I converted to the CPA code
(8digit-level product code) using the RAMON Tables of conversion16. The latter uniquely corre-
sponds to the Nace Rev.2 classification (the first four digits of the CPA code are indeed the Nace
Rev.2 code).
In order to be consistent with the Tradeprod database, I created a conversion table linking the Nace
Rev.2 classification to the ISIC2, 3digits one using the United Nations Statistics Division tables
(See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry): the Nace Rev.2 classification uniquely corresponds to
ISIC Rev.4, which corresponds to ISIC Rev. 3.1, and the latter can be finally converted directly
into ISIC2, 3digits.
For some of the Comext bilateral flows, two entries are included: the one reported by the importer
and the one reported by the exporter. In these instances, I kept the importer’s figure.
TradeProd data is in thousands of dollars. Prodcom data (in thousands of ECU) and Comext data
(in Euro) were converted in dollars using the currency conversion tables provided by the Eurostat
and the OANDA database (oanda.com) on historical currency rates.
Creation of the product-level dataset used in Section 5
Rauch (1999) classifies goods according to the SITC Rev.2 system. The Comext data I collected
are instead organized according to their CN code. I converted them to the CPA code and then
to the HS2007 one, again using the RAMON Tables of conversion. Then, following the WITS
16See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/relations/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LSTREL
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tables (http://wits.worldbank.org/product concordance.html), I could link HS2007 to SITC Rev.2.
I finally linked Nace2 codes to SITC Rev.2 codes and therefore I could attach a SITC Rev.2 code
to the Prodcom data as well.
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Trade and Growth in the Age of Global
Value Chains
joint with Carlo Altomonte and Italo Colantone
2.1 Introduction
Assessing the causal impact of trade on growth is a relevant but notoriously difficult exercise,
because of the endogeneity of trade. Countries whose income is higher for reasons that are not
driven by trade, in fact, may still engage in more trade. Since the seminal paper of Frankel and
Romer (1999), the trade-growth relationship has been investigated through different instrumental
variable strategies. The most recent studies provide evidence of a positive effect of trade on growth
by exploiting shocks to transportation technology that have an asymmetric impact on different trade
flows, depending on some geographic characteristics of country pairs (Feyrer (2009); Pascali (2014)).
However, none of the existing studies considers the increasing role of global value chains (GVCs).
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In fact, they exploit historical shocks for identification, dating before the surge of GVCs, and they
focus solely on gross export data, which are not informative of the value-added contribution of each
country to trade.
In the world of GVCs, as production processes are split across different nations, the gross exports
of any country embody an increasing share of foreign value added. Moreover, since intermediate
inputs cross borders multiple times (Koopman et al. (2014)), trade figures are subject to double-
counting problems. Finally, countries are different in the extent to which they participate to global
value chains, and also in their positioning within them, i.e. from assembling to higher up stages of
the production chain. The implications of such processes for the trade-growth nexus have not been
directly investigated so far. In this paper, we aim to shed light on this.
We make three contributions. First, we develop a new geography-based, time-varying instrument
for trade encompassing the surge of GVCs. In order to do so, we exploit a recent technological shock:
the sharp increase in the maximum size of container ships, which has roughly tripled between 1995
and 2007, increasing from 5,000 to 15,000 TEU1. This shock affects different trade flows asymmet-
rically, depending on the presence of deep-water ports (DWPs) across countries. In fact, the new
larger ships can only enter such ports (deeper than 16 meters), which are unevenly distributed across
countries. Exploiting this source of identification, we obtain an instrument for exports by estimat-
ing gravity equations. Second, we use this instrument to show that export has a positive effect on
GDP per capita, with an elasticity of roughly 0.61. Exploiting country-level data, we also show that
export affects growth through capital deepening. Third, using the export decomposition method-
ology by Wang et al. (2013), we show that differences in the value-added composition of exports
1A TEU stands for a Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit, a unit of cargo capacity generally used to describe the capacity
of container ships and container terminals. See infra for more details.
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matter for moderating the trade-growth nexus. In fact, we find evidence of a growth premium for
those countries that upgrade their positioning in GVCs more than others over time. This result is
robust to an alternative, demand-based definition of positioning such as the upstreamness measure
proposed by Antras and Chor (2013). Participation in the GVCs, instead, does not seem to have a
role for moderating the trade-growth nexus.
Our analysis covers 40 countries included in the WIOD database, accounting for more than 85%
of world trade, from which we draw data on gross exports at the industry level for the period 1995-
2007. Seaborne containerized trade has been the fastest growing modality of seaborne trade over the
sample, ultimately accounting for about 40% of total trade in the world (WEO, 2012). Moreover,
improvements in containerized trade have been pivotal for the surge of global value chains (see Bern-
hofen et al. (2013) and Memedovic et al. (2008)), whose implications are investigated in our analysis:
the WIOD data, in fact, allows to decompose each gross export flows in its different value added
components. In our sample of countries we have identified a total of 52 deep-water ports, needed
for the larger ships introduced after 1995 to dock. The identification of these ports was non trivial,
due to lack of a unique and ready-to-use data source. In particular, we had to collect information
on the water depth (and other characteristics) for more than 3,500 ports, by performing a detailed
text analysis of a number of different web sources. As a result of that, we have created a new
original database containing comprehensive information for each port. The number of deep water
ports in each country is fixed in our sample, and thus is a time-invariant geographic characteristic.
Indeed, according to our port data, it is only after 2007 that countries have systematically started
to transform standard ports into deep water ports by dredging (e.g. in New York). For this reason,
we ensure the validity of the exclusion restriction by considering trade flows until 2007 only in our
analysis.
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We build up our instrument by predicting bilateral industry-level exports in a gravity framework,
similarly to Frankel and Romer (1999) and subsequent papers (e.g. Feyrer (2009); Felbermayr and
Gro¨schl (2013)). Our gravity equation includes the standard dyadic controls (distance, contiguity,
etc.) together with their interaction between the maximum size of container ships available in the
world market in a given year multiplied by number of deep water ports, in both the origin and the
destination country (normalized by the length of the coastal line). With this procedure, the increase
in the size of container ships, common across countries, is allowed to have different effects on the
each regressor’s elasticity of trade. These effects can vary across bilateral flows thanks to the geo-
graphical source of exogenous variation across country-pairs that we are considering, i.e. countries’
endowment of DWPs, which made the employment of larger container ships possible. Moreover,
differently from the previously cited studies, we estimate gravity equation at the bilateral-sectoral
level, allowing the increase in the size of container ships not only to have an asymmetric impact
across country-pairs, but also to affect differently trade flows in different sectors.
Then, we use our gravity estimates to compute the component of each bilateral-sectoral flow that
is predicted by our regressors, hence exogenous to the income formation process. We aggregate
these values at the exporting country level and use such predicted export flows as an instrumental
variable in the income regressions, in which we assess the impact of trade on per capita GDP. Our
novel instrument appears to be a powerful predictor of exports. We find evidence of a positive effect
of exports on GDP per capita, with an elasticity of about 0.61. This result is submitted to a large
number of robustness and sensitivity checks, concerning the specification of the gravity and of the
growth regressions, as well as the way in which DWPs are identified.
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In the second part of the paper, we explore whether different roles played by countries in GVCs
matter for the relationship between trade and income. To this purpose, we start by employing the
methodology by Wang et al. (2013).2, which allows for an exact decomposition of each bilateral-
sectoral export flow into several value added components. Thanks to this decomposition we can
construct two GVC indicators. The first indicator is a proxy for a country’s participation to GVCs,
and is defined as the share of foreign value accounted for by pure double counting (Wang et al., 2013).
This indicator grows as cross-country production sharing deepens and a country gets more involved
in global value chains. The second indicator reflects the positioning of a country within global value
chains, defined as the share of foreign value that is embodied in intermediate exports (Wang et al.,
2013). If a country engages mostly in assembling, i.e. at the bottom of the value chains, and thus
exports mostly final goods, this indicator will be very low. Instead, it will increase as countries move
to higher-up stages in the value chain. We also refer to the work by Antras and Chor (2013) and
construct a third indicator: the upstreamness one, again related to the positioning of each country
in the GVCs, but constructed from a different perspective. In fact, it is a demand-based measure,
reporting the average “distance”, in terms of production steps, from the consumption of the final
good. We find evidence of a higher growth effect for those countries that upgrade their positioning in
GVCs more than others over the sample. According to our estimates, this growth premium is about
30% of the average effect of export. Similarly, countries with higher growth levels of upstreamness
gain more in terms of per capita GDP from an increase in trade. An increase in participation to
GVCs, instead, does not play a significant role. Overall, our findings suggest that, in the age of
global value chains, the trade-growth nexus is crucially moderated by the modalities through which
a country participates to global production sharing.
2We are very grateful to Zhi Wang, Shang-Jin Wei, and Kunfu Zhu for having shared their data on the exports’
decomposition with us.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 discusses the evolution of containerized trade over the sample, and the role of deep-water
ports. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the main results on trade and
growth and discusses the role of GVCs. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Our paper speaks to different strands of the literature. In particular, it contributes to the liter-
ature on trade and growth, in which a number of studies have adopted an instrumental variables
approach based on gravity estimations. In their seminal paper, Frankel and Romer (1999) focused
on geographical characteristics such as the bilateral distance between countries, which are indeed
powerful determinants of trade flows. However, the exogeneity of such geographical variables to the
income formation process has later been criticized as they might affect countries’ growth through
channels other than trade, thus violating the exclusion restriction. Evidence on this issue has been
provided, for instance, with respect to the role of distance from the equator (Rodriguez and Rodrik,
2001).
Recent empirical contributions built on the Frankel and Romer (1999) approach by considering
shocks to transportation technology as instruments for exports, which have an asymmetric effect
across country pairs due to exogenous geographic characteristics, hence are exogenous to the income
formation process (Feyrer (2009), and Pascali (2014)).3. Specifically, Feyrer (2009) exploits the re-
duction in air transportation costs between 1960 and 1995, which has had a larger positive effect on
trade for country-pairs whose air distance is much shorter than sea distance. Pascali (2014) instead
3Felbermayr and Gro¨schl (2013) have also developed a time-varying instrument for trade in a gravity framework, by
using natural disasters in partner countries as a source of variation over time, rather than a transportation shock.
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exploits the introduction of the steam engine in the shipping industry, between the 1860s and the
1870s, which has reduced shipping costs relatively more for trade routes that were not favored by
wind patterns. The time dimension of such instruments makes it possible to work with panel data,
which is crucial in this context: it allows the inclusion of country fixed effects in the regressions,
which control for any constant determinants of income, such as historical, institutional and geo-
graphical factors (including distance from the equator). However, none of these studies takes into
account the role of global value chains. In fact, they exploit identification shocks that date before
their surge, which started in the mid 90s. Moreover, they rely solely on gross exports data, which
do not capture differences in the participation and positioning of countries in GVCs.
In this paper, we follow a similar identification strategy as in Pascali (2014) and Feyrer (2009).
However, our gravity equation is estimated at the sectoral-bilateral level, allowing the transportation
shock to have a differentiated impact across country-pairs as well as across sectors. Moreover, we
rely on a more recent shock to transportation technology, which happens at the same time as the
surge of global value chains and is pivotal for their development. This allows us to investigate the
key role of GVCs in moderating the relationship between trade and growth. We regard this issue as
crucial for today’s trade policy.
Our results show that trade affects income via its effect on capital accumulation. This is consistent
with several studies proving that the investment share increases as a consequence of trade liberal-
ization and openness (see Wacziarg (2001) and Baldwin and Seghezza (1996)). Recently, Anderson
et al. (2015) provided a microfoundation of the Frankel and Romer (1999) approach by developing
and estimating a structural dynamic general equilibrium model in which capital accumulation is the
key channel through which trade affect income growth.
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Our work is also related to the growing literature on GVCs. From the methodological point of
view, a number of contributions have provided the tools for decomposing gross export flows into
their different value added components (Johnson and Noguera (2012); Koopman et al. (2014); Wang
et al. (2013)). We capitalize on these studies, in particular Wang et al. (2013), for assessing how
differences in the value added composition of gross exports moderate the trade-growth nexus. Other
papers have exploited the decomposition by Koopman et al. (2014) for studying the evolution of
value-added exports over the recent financial crisis (e.g. Nagengast and Stehrer (2015)). A recent
study by Johnson (2014) focuses instead on the role of GVCs with respect to the synchronization
of business cycles across countries. Our paper is different, as it studies the causal relation between
exports and economic growth, taking into account the extent to and the modalities through which
countries participate in global value chains.
2.3 Container ships and DWPs
Containers started to be developed and used for commerce in the US during the mid 50s. Be-
fore the introduction of container ships, goods were transported using break-bulk cargo, thus they
needed to be moved individually. As a result, a large part of the shipping time was spent in ports,
waiting for ships to be unloaded and loaded back again. Containers tremendously improved the
efficiency of sea-transportation, shortening the time spent into port facilities, and soon the container
technology started spreading to other countries. International standardization followed in 1965, and
by the mid 80s containers were widely adopted worldwide4. The diffusion of containerized trade has
had a positive impact on trade. In particular, Bernhofen et al. (2013) find that, during the period
4In a sample of 157 countries used to track the development of containerization, Bernhofen et al. (2013) find that
122 countries had adopted containerized trade (either by sea or rail) by 1983. The remaining 35 countries were
mostly developing economies, none of which appears in our sample.
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1962-1990, the joint adoption of containerized trade for two trading partners could increase their
bilateral trade flows by up to 700%, cumulatively over 20 years. Containerization has thus been
identified as an important driver of globalization.
Besides boosting trade in the 80s, containerization has also been instrumental for the development
of GVCs from the mid 1990s. Indeed, it is widely recognized that the benefits associated with the
break-up of production processes across countries could not be realized without significant parallel
improvements in logistics, IT and transportation technology (see, for instance, Notteboom and Ro-
drigue (2008) and Memedovic et al. (2008)). In fact, during the surge of GVCs, with the associated
acceleration in world merchandise trade, containerized seaborne trade experienced average growth
rates exceeding 10 per cent per year in volumes. As a result, by 2010 this modality of trade ac-
counted for around 40% of the total value of global merchandise trade5.
This recent growth of seaborne containerized trade is associated with a shock to transportation
technology: between 1995 and 2007 the maximum capacity of container ships has roughly tripled,
from around 5,000 to 15,000 TEU (see Figure 2.1)6. The shock was not an isolated event (e.g. a
one-off launch of a large ship), but a true game changer for the industry. To give an idea of the
relevance of the shock in terms of adoption of the new technology, consider the following: since the
standardization and widespread adoption of container transport between the 70s and the mid 90s,
the maximum size of container ships increased at a roughly linear pace of 110 TEU per year. As a
result, it took 30 years for the world fleet of container ships to reach an average capacity of 1,500
TEU. Instead, in the 13 years between 1995 and 2007, the adoption of increasingly larger vessels
5In 2010 all forms of seaborne trade represented 75% of world merchandise trade volumes and 60% of value, with
the large majority (around 60%) of seaborne trade value made up by containerized seaborne trade (WEO, 2012).
6A TEU stands for a Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit. It is based on the volume of an internationally standardized
intermodal container, 20-feet-long (6.1 m) and 8-feet-wide (2.44 m). No precise standard exists on height, although
in general the most common height is 8 feet 6 inches (2.59 m), to fit into railway tunnels.
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led to a sharp increase in the average capacity of the world fleet of container ships: from 1,500 to
roughly 2,500 TEU (see the solid line in Figure 2.1). This is unsurprising if one considers that an
increase from 5,000 to 15,000 TEU in capacity is estimated to bring about a reduction in annual
operation cost from around 700$ to 400US$ per TEU (OECD, 2015).
Figure 2.1: Development of container ships (TEU), 1970-2015
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The technological shock in the size of container ships generates an important source of exogenous
variation in trade across countries. As a matter of fact, not all countries are equally endowed with
ports that are deep enough to accommodate the new larger container ships. In particular, before
1994 ports whose depth was at least 13 meters could accommodate any container ships, as the
maximum draft of these ships was 12 meters.7 After 1994, new larger ships were introduced over
7The size of container ships was in fact constrained to fit the dimensions of the Panama canal’s lock chambers. The
so-called Panamax ships had to have maximum dimensions, as disciplined by the Panama Canal Authority, of
294,13 m (965 ft) in length, 32,31 m (106 ft) in width and 12,04 m (39.5 ft) in draft, which yielded a maximum
physical payload capacity of around 4,500 TEU. The draft of the ship is defined as the distance between the surface
of the water and the lowest point of the vessel.
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time, as reported in Table 2.1. With the increase in dimensions and capacity, the maximum draft
of container ships increased from 12 to roughly 16 meters, to a point in which these vessels could
only access a restricted number of ports with adequate depth. We define Deep Water Ports (DWPs)
those ports that have a container terminal and whose depth is at least 16 meters: these ports can
accommodate all the container ships operating in our period of interest, i.e. from 1995 to 2007.8
Table 2.1: Evolution of Container Ships
Ship Adoption (year) Capacity (TEU) LOA (m) Breath (m) Draft (m)
Panamax Before 1994 4,500 294 32 12
NYK Altair 1994 4,900 300 37 13
Regina Maersk 1996 7,100 318 43 14
Sovereign Maersk 1997 8,100 347 43 14
Gudrun Maersk 2005 10,150 367 43 15
Emma Maersk 2006 15,500 397 56 15.5
Authors’ elaboration on data from Alphaliner, Maersk and www.containership-info.com
In order to identify DWPs across countries, we have started from an on-line repository of world
ports (www.worldportsource.com), collecting information on 4,764 ports in 196 countries. We have
then restricted the attention to ports located in the 40 countries covered by the WIOD dataset, for
which we are able to decompose gross trade flows in value-added terms. The latter yielded 3,529
ports, which we have individually checked for maximum depth and container activity by performing
a detailed text analysis of several web sources.9 Figure 2.2 reports the number of ports, by depth
and specialization, across the 40 countries. There are a total of 52 deep water ports according to
our definition.10 Their average depth is 18.3 meters. As it can be seen, there are 30 additional ports
8The largest ships operating in our period of interest are the eight Maersk E Series ships of which the Emma Maersk
was the first. These ships, with a draft at maximum load estimated between 15.5 and 16m, might not fit in the
shallowest of our DWPs, i.e. those with a depth not much deeper than 16m. However, these ships would not be
loaded always at maximum capacity, and they are operational only for the last year of our considered time period
(they were launched in middle of 2006). Our results are in any case robust to employing a 17 meters threshold for
the identification of DWPs.
9Worldportsource.com describes for each port its characteristics (number and length of berths, depth at quay,
maximum depth, etc.) as well as the type of ongoing commercial activity, i.e. whether the port handles dry bulk
cargo, oil and/or containers. If relevant information was missing, the latter has been recovered through the website
of the specific port. Note that on Wikipedia it is possible to retrieve a list of DWPs presented as ’Panamax’ ports.
However, as also recognized on the same web page, the article is outdated, and the list incomplete and imprecise.
10In order for a port to satisfy the depth criterion, a depth of at least 16 meters has to be reported alongside quays,
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that would qualify as DWPs in terms of depth, but do not have a container terminal. This means
that, technically speaking, all the new larger ships introduced over the sample could enter those
ports, but could not be loaded/unloaded there. In the empirical analysis, we discuss the sensitivity
of the results with respect to considering also these additional ports, as well as the 106 ports with a
container terminal that have a depth of at least 13 meters. Table 2.2 reports the distribution of the
52 deep water ports across countries.
Figure 2.2: Number of ports, by depth and specialization, WIOD countries
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The relative presence of DWPs across countries depends to a large extent on exogenous geographic
and not at anchoring, as container ships need to be berthed to quays in order to be loaded/unloaded by cranes. In
this sense, container ships are different from oil carriers, that can be loaded/unloaded while anchored, via specific
floating storage and oﬄoading units moored offshore. Moreover, we have checked that access ways to the port
quays, e.g. canals, also satisfy the minimum depth requirement of 16 meters.
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characteristics, such as location and coastal conformation. For instance, oceanic coasts are more
likely to host deep-water harbors than coasts of internal seas such as the Black Sea. In our base-
line specification we will consider the 52 DWPs equipped with container terminals, because these
are indeed those where the larger vessels introduced after 1995 can dock. Indeed, we will show
in Section 5.3 that, if we consider all ports deeper than 16m irrespectively of their endowment of
container facilities, our predictor of trade gets worse. However, one may wonder that an investment
in supporting infrastructure is required in order to develop deep water ports, which could then be
endogenous to the GDP growth of hosting countries. To make sure that the exclusion restriction
is satisfied, we will run an additional robustness check considering only deep water ports in desti-
nation countries. Conditional on controls, in fact, the presence of DWPs in importer countries can
have an impact on the exporter’s GDP only through the trade channel. The result appears to be
qualitatively unchanged.
One could even be worried that new deep water ports are created over time by dredging existing
ports, in order to accommodate the new larger ships. We investigated the history of each port to
make sure that the reported depth has not been artificially altered during the time span of our
analysis. As a matter of fact, dredging activities have been systematically undertaken only after the
end of our sample, for instance at the ports of New York and New Jersey, Baltimore, and Miami.
Typically, port upgrading has happened after 2010, following the launch of the largest container
ships and, most importantly, the expansion of the Panama Canal locks, whose project has been
finalized in 2009, with completion expected in 2016.11
11The maximum dimension of ships in the new locks are 366 m (1,200 ft) in length, 49 m (160.7 ft) in width, and
15.2 m (49.9 ft) in draft).
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Table 2.2: Number of DWPs with container terminal by country
Country DWPs Country DWPs
AUS 2 IRL 0
AUT 0 ITA 3
BEL 1 JPN 2
BGR 0 KOR 3
BRA 1 LTU 0
CAN 1 LUX 0
CHN 9 LVA 0
CYP 0 MEX 2
CZE 0 MLT 0
DEU 2 NLD 1
DNK 0 POL 0
ESP 8 PRT 0
EST 1 ROM 1
FIN 0 RUS 0
FRA 3 SVK 0
GBR 1 SVN 0
GRC 1 SWE 0
HUN 0 TUR 0
IDN 0 TWN 3
IND 3 USA 4
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2.4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy has three steps. In the first step, we estimate a modified gravity equation
for exports from country i to country j in sector z at time t (Ti,j,z,t). In the second step, we use the
estimates from the above gravity regressions, aggregated at the exporting-country level, to compute
the component of countries’ overall trade that in principle should not depend on income. In the
third step, we use such estimated trade flows as an instrument to investigate the impact of actual
trade on income.
The gravity equations are estimated on gross export flows at the bilateral country-industry level
derived from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), a project funded by the European Com-
mission, Research Directorate General and carried out by a consortium of 12 research institutes
(see Timmer et al. (2015) for a detailed description). The database provides information on export
flows12 and Input-Output matrices for 40 countries and 34 industries, including both manufacturing
and services, and thus allows for the decomposition of gross exports in domestic vs. foreign value
added components that we will employ in Section 5.3. The Appendix reports a list of the countries
(Table A1) and of the manufacturing industries (Table A2) involved in our study.
In the first step, we estimate a gravity equation sector by sector over 14 manufacturing industries.
The geographical, institutional and historical variables that we consider as possible determinants of
trade flows are summarized in the following vector X:
12Zero trade flows are not included in the dataset, instead some figures are not reported. However, these missing
observations account for only about 4% of country-sector-year observations for the manufacturing industries.
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X =

ln(dist)i,j
contigi,j
landlocki,j
colonyi,j
comlegali,j
comlangi,j
RTAi,j

where disti,j is population-weighted distance. contigi,j , landlockednessi,j are additional geographic
controls, taking value 1 respectively if the two countries share a border or if at least one of them is
landlocked (and zero otherwise). colonyi,j and comlegali,j are historical-institutional dyadic vari-
ables, referring to the countries ever being in a colonial relationship of having common legal origin,
whereas comlangi,j and RTAi,j take value 1 if the countries share their common official language
or are members of the same Regional Trade Agreement. All these dyadic variables were obtained
from the CEPII database (Head et al., 2010).
For each one of these regressors, we will consider both its direct effect on trade flows as well
as the interaction with the novel variables that we propose: DWPk × log(MaxSizet), k = (i, j),
obtained interacting the number of DWPs on either the importer or the exporter’s shore with the
maximum size of container vessels available in each year. This specification is aimed to capture, and
employ as source of exogenous variation in the income formation process, the asymmetrical effects
that a common shock across countries, such as the increase in ships’ size over time, had on trade
flows between different countries via their different endowments with DWP. This corresponds to
transforming each element x of X as follows:
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x˜ = x
[
γ0 + γXDWPi × ln(MaxSizet) + γMDWPj × ln(MaxSizet)
]
(2.4.1)
With this procedure, we allow the effect of each regressor on export flows to vary with the number
of DWPs in each country, needed for container ships to dock. In other words, the common tech-
nological shock across countries, i.e. the increase in size of container vessels, can affect the trade
elasticity of each one of our regressors depending on each country’s endowment of DWPs.
The gravity equation that we estimate takes then the following form:
lnTi,j,z,t =δz,0 + δz,1 ˜ln(dist)i,j,t + δz,2 ˜contigi,j,t + δz,3 ˜landlocki,j,t + δz,4 ˜colonyi,j,t+
δz,5 ˜comlegali,j,t + δz,6 ˜comlangi,j,t + δz,7 ˜RTAi,j,t + νi,z,t + νj,z,t + i,j,z,t (2.4.2)
Notice that this gravity equation is consistent with theoretical microfoundations such as the one
provided in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003b), as we included multilateral resistance terms, which
we control for using importer-time and exporter-time fixed effects. This prevents us from directly
including in the right-hand-side the first order interaction DWPk× log(MaxSizet), (k = i, j) terms,
because they would be absorbed by the fixed effects. Our novel variables are then present only in the
interaction terms. As a consequence, we estimate the effects of new larger ships in attenuating (or
enhancing) the impact of each one of the dyadic controls on bilateral-sectoral trade flows. Moreover,
all coefficients have been indexed with z to indicate that regressions are run at the sector level. In
fact, we are allowing the time-shock to have a differentiated impact not only across country-pairs,
but also across sectors.
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In the second step, we use the estimates obtained from the bilateral-sectoral gravity equations
estimated above to construct the instrument for the growth regression. We exponentiate the
bilateral-sectoral component of ln(Ti,j,z,t) predicted by our regressors together with all the DWPk×
log(MaxSizet), (k = i, j) interaction terms, for each sector and each country-pair. Then, we ag-
gregate such predicted values over sectors and partner countries to get an exporter-time measure of
trade that can be used as instrument, since it does not depend on income.
EstimTradei,t =
∑
j
∑
z
exp(δˆzX˜) (2.4.3)
In the third step, we take the logarithm of EstimTradei,t and use the constructed ln(EstimTradei,t)
as an instrumental variable to investigate the impact of actual trade on income. In particular, we
will estimate
ln(GDPpci,t) = a0 + b ln(Ti,t) + µi + µt + ui,t (2.4.4)
where GDPpcit and Tit are respectively per capita GDP and total export of country i at time t. The
equation will be estimated using both OLS and 2SLS, in which ln(EstimTradei,t) constructed above
will be used as instrumental variable for Ti,t. Importantly, the panel nature of our dataset allows for
the inclusion of αi, a country-level fixed effect controlling for all non-time varying country’s specific
characteristic (such as the distance from the equator) and αt, a year fixed effect.
We also check for for potential sources of income growth, and specifically for changes in the capital
stock per worker. Thanks to the data contained in the WIOD input-output tables, we can investigate
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this channel also at the country-industry level: in fact, the dataset includes information on physical
capital per worker for each sector. Therefore, we can analyze to what extent trade affects growth
through by estimating the following equation
ln(Capi,z,t) = c0 + d ln(Ti,z,t) + αi,z + αt + ui,z,t (2.4.5)
Notice that, for this specification, we will instrument ln(Ti,z,t) with ln(EstimTradei,z,t), i.e. we
need exporter-industry estimated trade flows. In order to do so, we will aggregate only across partner
countries when performing the second step of our procedure, thus keeping the sectoral dimension.
The same equation will be estimated at the country-level as well, aggregating the predicted trade
values across sectors as in the baseline.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Gravity Estimations
We estimated Equation (4.2) on the 14 manufacturing sectors included in the WIOD database. Ta-
ble 2.R.1 reports the results for three of them: “Food, Beverage, Tobacco”, “Textiles” and “Leather
and Footwear”.
Consistent with the literature, the distance coefficient is significant at the 1% level, negative and
relatively stable across sectors, as one would expect: the farther away countries are, the more diffi-
cult it becomes for them to engage in international trade. The contiguity coefficient is positive and
strongly significant, even though its magnitude varies across sectors. The estimated first-order effect
of the other dyadic variables varies instead across sectors, both with respect of its sign as well as its
magnitude.
58
Chapter 2 Trade and Growth in the Age of Global Value Chains
The interactions of the previously described regressors with our novel variable (DWPk×ln(MaxSizet), k =
(i, j)) are statistically significant at the 1% level in most cases. Our gravity estimates stress the
importance of containerized trade in the time period analyzed. Consider, for instance, distance
between countries: one of the strongest empirical findings in international trade is its effect in de-
pressing trade (Head and Mayer (2014)). Our results show that the distance elasticity of trade is
significantly moderated (at the 1% confidence level) by countries’ endowment of DWPs for all the 14
manufacturing sectors included in our analysis: for a given ships’ size, distance has a lower impact
in reducing trade the higher the number of DWPs in either the origin or the destination country.
Moreover, we will show in Section 5.2 that the introduction of the interaction terms does also make a
difference for our main result: in fact, the exogenous component of trade constructed including them
in the gravity regression is a much better predictor of total trade than the one obtained considering
the dyadic regressors only, i.e. without interacting them with our novel variable.
2.5.2 Trade and Income
Following the procedure described above, we exponentiate the estimated component of trade ex-
plained by geographical, institutional and historical variables and their interaction with our novel
variable for each bilateral-sectoral observation. Hence, we aggregate them at the exporter-year level
to get instrumental variables to be used in the income regression, according to the specification of
Equation (4.4). The estimated coefficients for the growth regression at the country level are reported
in Table 2.R.2, together with their OLS counterpart (Column (1)).
Column (2) reports the 2SLS result obtained including in the gravity regression all the dyadic
regressors described above, together with their interaction with our novel variables (both for the
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importer and for the exporter). Our result shows that increasing export in manufacturing by 10%
has a positive impact on GDP per capita of about 6.1% percent. This result is consistent with
the one reported by Feyrer (2009), who finds a trade elasticity of about 0.5 for total trade. The
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is well above the standard threshold of 10 proposed by Staiger and Stock
(1997). The first stage result, i.e. the coefficient obtained regressing actual manufacturing trade
on the one predicted, is significant at the 1% level and negative: as Table 2.R.1 shows, in fact, the
coefficient associated with distance has the highest magnitude in all gravity regressions and distance
has a negative effect on trade, thus explaining the sign of the first stage 2SLS coefficient.
Notice that the 2SLS coefficients are higher than the OLS ones, consistent with the results of the
literature. The traditional explanation for this finding, put forward by Frankel and Romer (1999),
is related to the fact that trade is an imperfect measure of income-enhancing interactions among
countries. As such, it ends up being correlated with the error term in the OLS income regression,
generating a standard downward bias in the estimated coefficient. Such a measurement error is
instead corrected in the IV regression, to the extent that the instrument better accounts for the
income-enhancing interactions among countries through the geographical and time variation.
Column (3) reports the result of the income regression obtained without including the interaction
terms in the gravity equation, i.e. setting γX and γM in Equation (4.1) equal to zero. The F-statistic
is above 10 even in this case, but it is much lower than the one reported in Column (2). This sug-
gests that our interaction variables, capturing the differential impact that containerized trade had
on different countries due to their different endowment of DWPs, does better than dyadic variables
only in predicting trade. Moreover, the effect of trade on income is very close to the OLS one.
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As a first sensitivity check on the power of our instrument, we performed the same exercise includ-
ing only geographic characteristics in the gravity regression: distance, contiguity and landlockedness
(“DCL” specification). Column (3) reports the trade-income result obtained interacting them with
our novel variables. The trade elasticity of income is lower than the previous estimate and this result
shows again that OLS biases this result downwards. As before, Column (4) reports the estimate
obtained considering only the three geographic regressors in the right-hand-side of the gravity equa-
tion, without including DWP variables. This corresponds to predicting trade with geography only.
The F statistic is now very low (about 4.8): again, the instruments constructed from our newly
proposed variables seem to be a better predictor of trade than geographical characteristics alone.
Our result is robust to considering different lags of trade on the right hand side of Equation
(4.2). Results are reported in Table 2.R.3 and show that the impact of international trade on in-
come is statistically significant at the 1% level when considering lags up to t-413. This seems to
suggest that the effect of trade on income might build up over time. Figure 2.5 provides a graphical
representation of the estimates. Moreover, we can estimate the impact of the change in predicted
trade on the change in GDP per capita over the entire time period covered by our sample (1995-
2007). Our results, reported in Column (6) of Table 2.R.3, show that the relationship is positive
and significant, the coefficient being qualitatively similar to the estimates obtained by Feyrer (2009).
Table 2.R.4 looks at the effect of trade on the main channel for income growth, i.e. capital
accumulation. In the first two columns, we consider variables at the country level. Our results
show that trade positively affects physical capital per worker: in particular, a 10% increase in
manufacturing exports boosts capital per worker by 6.5%, consistently with previous contributions.
13Notice, however, that the F statistic is above 10 only for the first and the second lag
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When looking at country-industry level data (Columns (3) and (4)), we find that sectoral trade
does not seem to have a positive impact on sectoral capital formation. This is probably due to the
disaggregated nature of the data. One of the motives linking trade to additional investment, in fact,
is the possibility of exploiting economies of scale due to increased market size (Wacziarg (2001)).
While this seems to be into play for the aggregate economy, it does not have to be necessarily true
for each one of the sectors composing it, especially if trade causes a reallocation of resources across
different sectors.
2.5.3 Robustness Checks
Before moving to the analysis of the role of global value chains in the trade-growth relationship,
we run a number of robustness and sensitivity checks of our results. In each one of them, we consider
different specifications of the initial gravity regression through which our instrument (predicted trade
flows) is constructed. Once again, we consider manufacturing trade in all regressions. Table 2.R.5
presents the estimated βˆ coefficient of the IV regression at the country level for each robustness
check, together with the F-statistic of the first-stage.
As previously discussed, we can expand the set of DWPs by including those ports that are not
endowed with container facilities, even though their depth is enough for the largest ships to dock
(greater than 16m). Our result shows a greater effect of trade in income, however the F statistic is
much lower, only slightly above 10 (see specification 1). This seems to indicate that it is indeed the
actual possibility for container ships to dock to matter for our baseline result. We also considered
all ports endowed with container terminals but whose depth is only 13m or higher (specification 2).
In this case, the estimated coefficient of the growth regression is basically unchanged.
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Larger container ships were introduced when technology allowed for the construction of efficient
larger vessels, but also when a sufficient number of trade routes became economically viable beyond
the ones going through the Panama Canal. One possible source of concern, therefore, is that our
technological shock has happened at the same time when China became a key player in the inter-
national trade scene. Chinese income growth, then, might be related to growth in other countries,
challenging the exogeneity of our instrument. In principle, since our instrument is predicted exports,
the impact that the Chinese boom may have had on other economies in the sample should not vio-
late the exclusion restriction, as long as the income effect is channeled through international trade.
Nonetheless, we performed a robustness check dropping all bilateral flows in which one of the trade
partners is China when estimating the gravity equation. In order to be consistent, we also dropped
all bilateral trade flows involving China when aggregating predicted trade at the exporting country
level in order to build our instruments. Specification 3 shows that our result is again substantially
unchanged.
In the baseline specification of the gravity equation, we regress ij trade flows on our variables of
interest, which include interactions with the number of DWP both on origin i and on partner j’s
shore. However, one could be worried about potential endogeneity of the home country’s DWPs, as
they could potentially be correlated with its income through channels other than trade (for instance,
domestic investment needed for the creation and the set-up of container facilities). Specification 4
shows that our result holds when excluding home DWPs from the gravity regression, the trade elas-
ticity of income being substantially unchanged. Clearly, we get an F statistic much lower than in
our baseline: in fact, we are now predicting domestic trade by employing only the differential effects
that DWPs in partner countries have in moderating the increase in the maximum size of container
ships.
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Moreover, our baseline regression allows for trade to be positively affected by containerization
even though the home country i has no DWPs or container facilities. As a matter of fact, the home
country could even be landlocked (for example, when considering Austria or Czech Republic). Still,
if we restrict our attention to those country pairs for which the home country has at least one DWP,
our results hold (Line 5). Notice that the number of countries considered gets halved: only one
every two countries is endowed with DWPs (see Table 2.2). Hence, similarly to what we did when
excluding China, also in this case we excluded trade with countries not having a DWP from the
aggregation of predicted trade flows used as instrument. Note also that the F test goes below the
critical level of 10 in the latter specification. This is likely due to the lower number of observations
we are now employing, with lower power: in fact, we are now estimating the relationship between
income and trade employing only a fraction of trade for each country , i.e. the one with partner
countries that have at least one DWP.
Our instrument is about seaborne trade. Most of the countries in our sample (27 out of 40),
however, are European and probably due to their proximity trade more by rail or truck than they do
by ship. For this reason, we want to verify the robustness of our results if we restrict the analysis to
trade flows that are more likely to happen by sea routes, i.e. restricting our attention to countries
that are far-away in terms of distance. For each one of the countries considered, we restrict our
attention to trade flows with partners that are farther away than the 50th, 75th or 90th percentile
in the sample (Lines 6, 7 and 8). Again the baseline result is confirmed, but the magnitude of the
coefficient appears to be smaller. This could be again due to the fact that we are now disregarding
a large part of each country’s trade in explaining its income.
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2.5.4 GVCs and the trade-growth nexus
Value-added trade data
Since the surge of GVCs, the gross value of export reported by national statistics has incorporated
different information with respect to the past. In fact, when the production process is completed
in different countries, intermediates crosses borders multiple times before being absorbed in their
final destination. Some items will then be counted more then once (Koopman et al., 2014). Fi-
nally, countries are different in the extent to which they participate to global value chains, and
also in their positioning within them, i.e. from assembling to higher up stages of the production
chain. Countries that are mainly assemblers and exporters of finished products would exhibit high
export values even though they are responsible for a tiny share of the value added to those goods.
Hence, in order to investigate the implications of such processes for the trade-growth nexus, we need
data on the exact composition of trade flows according to the location where value added was created.
To this extent, we rely on the methodology developed by Wang et al. (2013) who have generalized
the work by Koopman et al. (2014), deriving a backward-linkage based decomposition of trade
allowing for a precise partition of bilateral export flows at the industry level14. Essentially, given a
gross export flow of 100 from the home country HC, in industry X, to the partner country PC, the
methodology by Wang et al. (2013) allows us to disentangle which share of the gross flow corresponds
to each value-added term as follows:
14As discussed by Wang et al. (2013), the measures of value-added trade currently used in the literature, such
as Vertical Shares (Hummels et al. (2001)), VAX (Johnson and Noguera (2012)) or the Koopman et al. (2014)
decomposition, are forward-linkage based, i.e. for each industry they include indirect value-added exports via gross
exports from other industries of the same exporting country. These measures allow for an exact decomposition of
aggregate export flows from each country towards the rest of the world. However, when working with bilateral flows,
and/or at the industry level, the former measures are problematic, as there is not a one-to-one link between value-
added exports and gross exports. For these reasons, if bilateral value-added trade measures at the industry level
are needed, one has to use backward-linkage based measures of value-added exports, in which a given industry’s
gross exports includes domestic value added produced in all the vertically related industries.
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• Domestic Value Added (DVA) is the value added generated in the exporting home country
(HC ) that is absorbed abroad (not necessarily in the partner country PC ).
• Returned Domestic Value Added (RDV) is the domestic value added embodied in the export
flows which returns home for final consumption. It includes the export of intermediates that
are processed abroad and return home, both as final as well as more advanced intermediate
goods.
• Foreign Value Added (FVA): it is the foreign value added embodied in domestic exports, both
in final goods and in intermediates.
• Pure Double Counting (PDC): it is the portion of gross exports accounted for by intermediates
crossing borders several times before being finally absorbed. PDC may include value added
generated both in the home country (HC ) and abroad.
Our data show that the break-up of the production process in different locations is indeed a rele-
vant empirical fact over the period considered. Table 2.3 shows the share of gross exports accounted
for by each value-added term, for each exporting country, on average across industries and years.
DVA accounts on average for 78% of gross exports, followed by FVA with around 16%, and PDC
with slightly more than 5%. RDV is on average much less relevant, below 1%, but it can rise above
40% for some export flows.15. Figure 2.3 reports information on the evolution of the VA shares by
year, on average across countries and industries, and of total gross exports as a fraction of GDP.
Consistent with the surge of GVCs, it can be noticed that the relative importance of DVA has been
decreasing over the sample period, while FVA, RDV, and PDC have become more relevant. The
change in the composition of exports brought about by global value chains motivates our analysis
15Overall, the relative importance of the four components may change substantially across different export flows. For
instance, foreign value added may account for up to 92% of gross exports for certain country-industry pairs in
given years. These changes reflect differences in the relevance and shape of GVCs across countries and industries.
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Table 2.3: Gross exports decomposition in VA
Mean SD Min Max
DVA 0.780 0.136 0.070 1
FVA 0.161 0.108 0 0.924
RDV 0.004 0.011 0 0.426
PDC 0.055 0.056 0 0.662
of the implications of GVCs for the relationship between trade and income growth.
Figure 2.3: Evolution of value-added components of exports over time
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The role of GVCs
We enrich our IV estimation of the trade-growth nexus with two indicators derived from the Wang
et al. (2013) decomposition. By summing up the foreign value added used in final (FVA FIN) and
in intermediate (FVA INT) good exports together with the PDC term from foreign sources (called
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FDC), it is possible to compute a measure of Vertical Specialization, the so-called “VS share”, that
Hummels et al. (2001) define as “imported inputs embodied in goods that are exported” (see Figure
2.4).
Figure 2.4: The VS share (from Wang et al. (2013))
The VS share does not inform us on the specific role played by a country in the production
chain. For that, we look at the different components of the same vertical specialization, to build
up two indicators. The first one is an indicator for the change in the positioning of a country
within global value chains, defined as the share of foreign value that is embodied in intermediate
exports, i.e. the (FVA INT)/VS ratio (Wang et al., 2013). If a country engages mostly in assem-
bling, i.e. at the bottom of the value chains, and thus exports mostly final goods, this indicator
will be very low. Instead, the indicator will increase as countries move to higher-up stages in the
value chain. As a matter of fact, the data support this claim: we find that high growth rates of the
FVA INT/VS share ratio are positively correlated with the share of hours worked by high skilled
workers: one more dollar in foreign value added in intermediates (FVA INT) is associated to a 35%
increase in the share of hours worked by high skilled employees. The second indicator is a proxy
for a country’s participation to GVCs, and is defined as the share of foreign value accounted for by
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pure double counting (Wang et al., 2013) over VS, i.e. the FDC/VS share. This indicator grows as
cross-country production sharing deepens, and a country gets more embedded in global value chains.
Moreover, it is possible to construct a third indicator on a country’s role in the GVCs, this
time based on a demand-side measure. Antras and Chor (2013) propose an index of upstream-
ness reporting the distance, measured in productive “steps”, between each industry and the final
consumer. When this indicator is close to one, we are considering an industry which is very “down-
stream”, i.e. close to the final consumer. Differently from the two previously proposed measures,
which are obtained using value added trade figures, this measure can be computed directly from the
Input-Output coefficients. Miller and Temurshoev (2015) provided upstreamness measures at the
country-industry-year level for the WIOD sample. Since we are estimating income regressions at the
exporting-country level, we need to aggregate these upstreamness measures across sectors to get a
measure for each country. We will do so constructing a weighted-average, in which sectoral weights
reflect the export share of each sector on total manufacturing export16. Cyprus, Turkey and Mexico
exhibit the lowest levels of country-level upstreamness constructed using this method. Moreover,
it is interesting to notice that our measure of upstreamness grows by about 8% over the sample
for upgrading countries (whose FVA INT/VS growth rate is above the sample average), whereas its
growth rate gets halved (about 4%) when considering non-upgrading countries.
To sum up, for each country we construct the growth rate over the sample period (1995-2007) of
the following three variables:
• the FDC/VS share, indicating participation to the GVCs
• the FVA INT/VS share, indicating positioning in the GVCs
16Results are basically unchanged when using GDP instead of export in the construction of the shares.
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics on GVCs indexes
Mean S.D. Min Max
VS share 0.322 0.123 0.067 0.639
FVA INT/VS 0.327 0.064 0.172 0.526
FDC/VS 0.236 0.065 0.067 0.423
Upstreamness 2.208 0.282 1.366 3.271
• upstreamness, a demand-side measure of positioning in the GVCs
Some descriptive statistics on these indexes, as well as of the VS share are reported in Table 2.4,
showing that there is substantial variation across countries for all of them.
We consider whether different modalities of participation to the GVCs affect the trade-growth
nexus by estimating again Equation (4.3), but this time we interact aggregate trade at the country
level with dummy variables, which take value one if the growth rate of the GVCs-related index is
above the sample mean for the country considered (and zero otherwise)17. Results are obtained
using the same IV strategy described before and are reported in Table 2.R.6.
Our estimates show that the trade-growth nexus is crucially moderated by the modalities through
which a country participates to global production sharing, but not by its degree of participation
in it. Column (2), in fact, shows that higher participation to the GVCs does not enhance the
growth-trade nexus. Positioning plays instead an important role: those countries moving away from
purely assembling roles (i.e. having high FVA INT/VS) exhibit an impact of trade on income 31%
higher than non-upgrading countries, probably as a consequence of an increase in their capability of
performing value-adding tasks (Column (3)). When considering the upstreamness measure, we get
17The results are substantially unchanged when using the levels of this indicators instead of dummy variables. We
decided to report the results obtained with dummy variables to be consistent with Wang et al. (2013), who
explicitly discuss the growth rate over time of FVA INT as an indicator for positioning in the GVCs
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results consistent with the latter finding: countries whose level of upstreamness grew more over the
sample exhibit a stronger relationship between trade and income (Column (4)). Not all trade is the
same and these findings show that the characteristics of trade flows are relevant when analyzing the
impact that international trade has on economic development.
2.6 Conclusion
The last decade of the Twenty first century witnessed the surge of GVCs: the production process
is now composed of different tasks, often performed in different locations. Containerization made
this possible: it strongly decreases transportation costs, especially when new and larger container
vessels were introduced. In this paper, we exploit this recent development to propose a novel instru-
ment for assessing the link between international trade and economic growth.
The geography-based, time-varying variables that we employ for the construction of our instru-
ment are constituted by the interaction between such a transportation shock, i.e. the increase in size
of container ships, and a geographic (exogenous) characteristic, the presence of DWPs in home and
partner’s shore, which are needed to accommodate the new larger ships. These regressors are shown
to mitigate the effects of standard gravity controls on export flows. In fact, the increase in the size
of container vessels, common across countries, has an asymmetric impact on the estimated elastic-
ities across different bilateral-sectoral trade flows, because of the relatively different endowment of
DWPs of each country. We construct predicted values for gross export in a gravity framework and
show that our novel variable does better than geographic and institutional characteristics only in
predicting gross exports.
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Our results show that trade has a positive effect on per capita income growth: over the period
between 1995 and 2007, we estimate that a 10% increase in manufacturing exports corresponds to
a 6.1% increase in income. Moreover, our result confirm that trade positively affects the capital
accumulation process. We contribute to the literature on GVCs by showing that the positive effect
of trade is not mediated by the degree of participation of a country to the GVCs, but is influenced
by the different positioning in it. In fact, our results suggest that upgrading countries, moving away
from the bottom of the chain, exhibit a 31% higher effect of trade on growth.
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(1) (2) (3)
Sector:
Food, Beverage, 
Tobacco
Texitiles
Leather and 
Footwear
Distance(log) -1.639*** -1.618*** -1.694***
[0.025] [0.027] [0.032]
Contiguity 0.482*** 0.175*** 0.434***
[0.058] [0.061] [0.075]
Landlockedness -0.742*** -0.268*** -0.038
[0.085] [0.089] [0.104]
Colonial Relationship 0.038 0.311*** 0.697***
[0.095] [0.098] [0.102]
Common Legal Origin 0.547*** 0.118*** 0.291***
[0.031] [0.034] [0.037]
Common Language 0.079 0.293*** 0.034
[0.076] [0.075] [0.085]
RTA 0.247*** -0.111*** -0.346***
[0.037] [0.038] [0.045]
Distance(log)*Importer's DWP*MaxSize(log) 0.006*** -0.001*** 0.005***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Contiguity*Importer's DWP*MaxSize(log) 0.005** -0.01 -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Landlockedness*Importer's DWP*MaxSize(log) 0.011*** 0.000 0.011***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Colonial Relationship*Importer's DWP*MaxSize(log) 0.059*** -0.03** -0.013
[0.016] [0.015] [0.016]
Common Legal Origin*Importer's DWP*MaxSize(log) 0.002*** 0.006*** -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Common Language*Importer's DWP*MaxSize(log) -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.003*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
RTA*Importer's DWP*MaxSize(log) 0.002 -0.010*** 0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Distance(log)*Exporter's DWP*MaxSize(log) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Contiguity*Exporter's DWP*MaxSize(log) 0.000 0.000 -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Landlockedness*Exporter's DWP*MaxSize(log) 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.01***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Colonial Relationship*Exporter's DWP*MaxSize(log) 0.078*** -0.072*** -0.099***
[0.02] [0.022] [0.02]
Common Legal Origin*Exporter's DWP*MaxSize(log) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Common Language*Exporter's DWP*MaxSize(log) -0.005*** -0.01*** -0.009***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
RTA*Exporter's DWP*MaxSize(log) -0.002* -0.003*** 0.008***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Obs. 20162 20208 19334
R2 0.83 0.81 0.81
All regressions include importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: log(trade)
Table 1 - Gravity estimation
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Considered trade:
Gross exports 0.270*** 0.610*** 0.284*** 0.355*** 0.149*
[0.051] [0.104] [0.097] [0.063] [0.087]
Estimator OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
RHS Gravity equation - Full Full DCL DCL
Interaction with DWP - yes no yes no
Country effects yes yes yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 507 507 507 507 507
R2 0.82 - - - -
First-stage results
Predicted trade flows from gravity - -1.056*** -0.592*** -1.164*** -0.363**
- [0.179] [0.172] [0.218] [0.166]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic - 34.83 11.90 28.56 4.796
Table 2 - Country growth regressions
Dependent Variable: GDP p.c. 
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
Manufacturing exports
Table 3 - Different specifications of growth regressions, manufacturing trade only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gross exports (t-1) 0.625***
[0.134]
Gross exports (t-2) 0.645***
[0.188]
Gross exports (t-3) 0.802***
[0.290]
Gross exports (t-4) 0.860***
[0.321]
Gross exports (t-5) 1.196*
[0.619]
∆Gross exports ('95-'07) 0.590***
[0.155]
Estimator 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Country effects yes yes yes yes yes -
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes -
RHS Gravity equation - Full Full Full Full Full
Obs. 468 429 390 351 312 39
First-stage results
Predicted trade flows -0.968*** -0.837*** -0.645*** -0.660*** -0.484* -1.454***
from country gravity [0.207] [0.240] [0.232] [0.244] [0.248] [0.413]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 21.91 . 12.16 7.744 7.316 3.814 12.38
.
Dependent Variable: GDP p.c. 
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 2.5: Effects of lagged exports on income
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Table 4 - Capital Deepening Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Considered trade:
Gross exports 0.183** 0.655*** 0.032 0.016
[0.072] [0.159] [0.035] [0.124]
Estimator OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Country-industry effect no no yes yes
Country effect yes yes no no
Year effect no no yes yes
Obs. 507 507 507 507
R2 0.72 0.37 -
First-stage results
Predicted trade flows - -1.044*** - -0.349***
from gravity - [0.181] - [0.069]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic - 33.41 - 25.50
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Physical Capital per worker
Manufacturing exports
Table 5 - Country growth regressions, manufacturing trade only- Robustness checks
Dependent Variable: GDP p.c. (t) Coefficient S.E. Obs. F-Stat
1) Depth>16m, no container terminal 0.950*** [0.218] 507 10.09
2) Depth>13m, container terminal 0.699*** [0.147] 507 20.14
3) Excluding China 0.567*** [0.095] 494 35.12
4) Considering only partner's DWP 0.669*** [0.141] 507 15.92
5) Considering only partner countries with at least one DWP 0.521*** [0.149] 247 7.062
6) Considering only far away country pairs (distance >median) 0.261*** [0.092] 507 10.46
7) Considering only far away country pairs (distance >75p) 0.382*** [0.131] 507 11.70
8) Considering only far away country pairs (distance >90p) 0.318*** [0.090] 505 19.41
All growth regressions include country and time fixed effects.
We consider ports with container facilities whose depth is greater than 16m unless otherwise specified.
Plain number of DWPs 0.228*** [0.069] 507 14.85
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
All gravity regressions include importer-time and exporter-time fixed effects.
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Panel A - OLS Regressions (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable:
Gross exports 0.270*** 0.202*** 0.257*** 0.252***
[0.051] [0.057] [0.038] [0.047]
Gross exports * Dummy high growth of FDC/VS 0.091*
[0.053]
Gross exports * Dummy high growth of FVA_INT/VS 0.089
[0.057]
Gross exports * Dummy high growth of Upstreamness 0.068
[0.050]
Obs. 507 507 507 507
R2 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83
Panel B - IV Regressions (1) (2) (3) (4)
Gross exports 0.610*** 0.548*** 0.615*** 0.544***
[0.104] [0.110] [0.114] [0.093]
Gross exports * Dummy high growth of FDC/VS 0.046
[0.040]
Gross exports * Dummy high growth of FVA_INT/VS 0.193***
[0.063]
Gross exports * Dummy high growth of Upstreamness 0.107**
[0.043]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 34.83 15.78 9.804 20.42
All regressions include country and time fixed effects. 
Table 6 - Growth regressions and value added trade, manufacturing trade only
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix
Table A1: Countries in the WIOD sample
Australia Japan
Austria Latvia
Belgium Lithuania
Brazil Luxembourg
Bulgaria Malta
Canada Mexico
China Netherlands
Cyprus Poland
Czech Republic Portugal
Denmark Romania
Estonia Russia
Finland Slovak Republic
France Slovenia
Germany South Korea
Greece Spain
Hungary Sweden
India Taiwan
Indonesia Turkey
Ireland U.S.A
Italy United Kingdom
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Table A2: Manufacturing industries in the WIOD sample
Food, Beverages and Tobacco
Textiles and Textile Products
Leather and Footwear
Wood and Products of Wood
Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear
Chemicals and Chemical Products
Rubber and Plastics
Other Non-Metallic Mineral
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
Machinery, Nec
Electrical and Optical Equipment
Transport Equipment
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling
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